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The thesis begins with a short section on the nature of neutrality in Europe
in the 1930s, and briefly introduces the political circumstances of the six nations
that remained neutral throughout the war. The primary subject of the paper deals
with the relationship between the belligerents and the neutral states, especially the
extent to which military strength and preparedness was responsible for the latter
maintaining their neutrality.
The degree to which military preparedness enabled the European neutrals
to remain non-belligerents in World War II varied, of course, country by country.
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But each of the six undertook expensive rearmament programs that were
substantially out of proportion to their prewar spending on arms. Certainly in the
cases of Switzerland and Sweden such arming played a major role in Germany's
decision to respect their neutrality. Spain and Portugal relied more on their status
of understood goodwill toward the Axis to protect themselves against aggression.
Ireland stood in the greatest danger of having its neutrality violated by the Allies;
none of the others were meaningfully threatened from this quarter. Turkey's
position on the geographical edge of the war eventually became its primary
guarantor of neutrality.
The major part of the research materials - books and articles - was
obtained from the libraries of Portland State University and the University of
Oregon and from the Multnomah County Library. There have been no substantive
treatments, either academic or popular, specifically concerning the European
neutrals since the 1956 survey, "The War and the Neutrals", edited by Arnold and
Veronica Toynbee. The specific matter of military preparedness in relation to the
neutrals' non-belligerency in World War II has not, to the best of my knowledge,
been the subject of a book.
My thesis conclusions were particularly weighed toward material from
Toynbee, from Gordon and Dangerfield's "The Hidden Weapon", from Roderick
Ogley's "The Theory and Practise of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century", from
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason's "The Undeclared War 1940-1941 ", and
from the "Documents on German Foreign Policy."
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PREFACE
Though the major historical emphasis of World War II is, of course, vested in
the two great warring blocs, one of the most interesting though least reported
aspects of the war deals with the half dozen European states that managed to
remain neutral. 1 This paper looks at the relationship between the belligerents and
these neutral states, and examines the extent to which their military capabilities or
preparedness was instrumental in the maintenance of their neutrality.
The position of neutrality within the contemporary imperialist
system is, under all conditions, not only a dangerous illusion which in
no way prevents a neutral state from being drawn into war, but is in
fact a justification of aggression, and a contributing factor to the
unleashing of war.
So said the 1939 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 2 and the Machiavellian
pragmatism of this statement speaks to the problems shared by those European
states which in 1939, when intracontinental war broke out, tried to remain free of
the struggle between opposing blocs.
Discussed in this paper will be the nature of neutrality and how this political
stance was so generally precariously maintained in Europe after September 1939,
followed by a brief review of the political circumstances of the six states - Spain,
Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Turkey - that remained neutral. The
thesis will examine most closely the extent to which each of these states was able
to control its own destiny as to participation in the war, or, conversely, whether
circumstances beyond each's control were the decisive factors in their neutrality.
1

Only five remained formally neutral throughout the war; Turkey made a last
minute declaration of war against Germany in early 1945.
•

2

quoted in Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester, 1963.
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Though the subject covered in this paper does not include those states
whose neutrality failed - Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Hungary,
Greece to list a few - it is important to understand that neutrality always represented
an often unreachable aspiration rather than an absolute. The two countries which
came out of the war as the most powerful of the victors - the United States and the
Soviet Union - had in 1939 been most vocal in their declarations of neutrality. 3
The subject of the successful World War II neutrals has been relatively little
treated. The best single reference source is Arnold and Veronica Toynbee's 1956
survey, The War and the Neutrals (Oxford University Press), in which a number of
scholarly authorities discuss the six countries' wartime experiences. The Hidden
Weapon by David Gordon and Royden Dangerfield (Harper & Bros., 1947) is
another important work on the subject, directed primarily at the nature of economic
warfare as waged on the neutrals; the authors were chiefs of the Blockade Division
of the wartime U.S. Foreign Economic Administration. The role of the neutrals in
locally-available war literature - histories, diaries, biographies - is sparse, as is
periodical literature on the subject. The Documents on German Foreign Policy,
available through 1942 at both the University of Oregon library and the Portland
State University library, are a useful source of information on German diplomatic
relations with the neutral states.

"3 Dennis J. Fodor, The Neutrals, Alexandria, 1982, 27.

CHAPTER I
NEUTRALITY
"Neutrality is rather like virginity"
Everybody starts off with it. ..
Roderick Ogley1
When the European war broke out in 1939, more than thirty independent
states stretched across the continent. By the end of 1941, only six of them - Spain,
Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Turkey2 - had managed to remain at
peace. None of these non-belligerents was completely "neutral" in practice, each
swinging precariously from one camp to the other in attempts, often frantic, to
appease its warring neighbors. 3 Through most of 1941, it was Germany's interests
that were usually favored for the understandable reason that Hitler seemed to be
winning. After 1941, the neutrals came more and more to hedge their bets in favor
of the Allied side as Germany's military edge began to dull.
As we'll discuss, all six occupied, to varying degrees, geographical positions
that were strategically important to the belligerents. Though each was peripheral to
Europe's center, none was a backwater that might remain impervious to external
pressure while it safely rode out the conflict - each had something both sides
wanted, whether it was raw or finished materials, ports, manpower, or an important
land or water passageway. The neutrals' locations and resources gave them an
1 Roderick

Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth
Century("The World Studies Series"), N.Y. Barnes & Noble, 1970.
2

3

Plus the tiny enclaves of Andorra and Vatican City.

J. Lee Ready, Forgotten Allies: Vol. 1 - The European Theater - The Military
Contribution of the Colonies, Exiled Governments and Lesser Powers to the Allied
Victory in World War II, Jefferson, N.C., 1985, 60-ff.
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importance highly disproportionate to their sizes or military capabilities. Though no
neutral was itself an economic powerhouse, their combined assets could
contribute very materially to a belligerent's war machine, as they would, in the
aggregate, for Germany. All had an appreciation of the value of their neutral status
to both blocs, and throughout the war each capitalized on this to the maximum
extent possible. In the first two or three years of the fighting many high-placed
persons in each of these countries believed in the inevitability of a German victory,
or, at minimum, that a stalemate would develop between the belligerents, leaving
Germany the dominant continental power. Of critical importance to their behavior,
all were either deeply suspicious of or outright antagonistic toward the Soviet
Union. Most would give way, in the early war years, to German demands - if only
slowly nonetheless steadily and in strategically important ways. 4
It should be stressed that even though states can, and often do, declare
their permanent neutrality, the concept itself logically exists only in a setting of war.
Though states are routinely allied to one another in peacetime, and some demand
their neighbors' alliance through military threats, 5 it is during armed conflicts that
professed neutral states stand most likely to lose their unaligned status. 6
According to Professor Roderick Ogley of the University of Sussex,
neutrality takes four different forms. The first is where it is imposed on a state, such
as on Belgium at its early 19th century inception, or on Austria in 1955 by the World
War II victors; second, there are the "traditional" neutrals, most notably Sweden
and Switzerland; third are the so-called "ad hoc" neutrals, the states that decide to
4

David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield, The Hidden Weapon -The Story

of Economic Warfare, New York, 1947, 57, 74-75.
5

It is, for example, difficult to imagine the Soviet Union allowing the German
Democratic Republic to leave the Warsaw Pact.
6

Ogley, Theory and Practice, 1.
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remain out of a particular war, such as Turkey in the Second World War; and,
finally, there is the nonaligned state, typified today by India, and which is in fact a
form professed by nearly all the new Asian and African nations. 7
Irrespective of a nation's professed neutrality, such neutrality nonetheless
stands in danger of violation when the interests of its war-making neighbors
override the counter-balancing costs of warring against the neutral. To be
effective, professions of neutrality have, in most cases, to be backed with the
military capability and determination to deter a belligerent from using the neutral
state's territory to further that belligerent's own war aims.
Throughout World War II, Iberia remained the one solidly neutral quadrant of
Europe. The two peninsular states were each ruled by right-wing authoritarian
leaders, men who had risen to power in the 1930s. In 1932 Portugal's conservative
and scholarly finance minister, Antonio Salazar, became prime minister, redeeming
years of political chaos with the relative civil orderliness provided by a militarysupported system, the so-called Estado Novo. Though Portugal retained its
centuries-long alliance with Britain, Salazar's one-party "New State" selfconsciously modeled itself on Hitler's and Mussolini's examples. After the
European war broke out, Salazar's cardinal principle of foreign policy was that
Portugal should remain neutral and should do everything in its power to see that
Spain also remained neutral; he reasoned that if the latter either entered the conflict
as a co-belligerent with the Germans or was invaded by Hitler, Portugal would
inevitably be dragged into its neighbor's war. 8 He also calculated, being cognizant
of Hitler's military strength, that he couldn't hope to maintain Portugal's colonial

1

!bid, 4.

8

Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal-A Biography, N.Y., 1970, 124-ff.
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empire in the event of a British loss, the Royal Navy being the guarantor of
Portugal's colonies against a German takeover. 9
Of the six neutrals, Spain came closest to actually entering the struggle on

the German side. But having been ravaged from 1936 to 1939 by its own Civil War,
Francisco Franco correctly judged his country was in no condition to fight in the
broader European war. Franco's one-man rule was diluted when he was forced
into domestic political concessions to the two main competing forces in his
victorious coalition, the traditional right-wing groups -the army, landowners,
monarchists - and the Falange, the mix of nationalists and socialists that was far
more radical than any of its Nationalist-coalition competitors. One of the primary
reasons for Spain's susceptibility to pressure from the belligerents both at the
outset and throughout the European war was the administrative chaos engendered
by Franco's attempts to pacify both sides of his often incompetent governing
coalition. 10
Franco, who held unprecedented fourfold authority in Spain - as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and as head of the state, of the
government, and of the Falangist party - considered himself and Spain under
obligation to both Hitler and Mussolini, the Axis leaders who had helped his
Nationalists achieve victory by providing critical military materiel and air support.
Though it is indisputable that Franco sympathized ideologically with the dictators,
especially after Germany attacked the hated Soviet Union in June 1941, he was
able to successfully play a cat-and-mouse game with them by assuring both Berlin
and Rome of his loyalty and support and promising to "eventually" join the Axis in
-g Gordon, The Hidden Weapon,
10

4.

Arnold Toynbee ed., The War and the Neutrals, "Survey of International
Affairs 1939-1946", Oxford, 1946, 258.
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battle. Instead, he kept Spain out oftheirwar. 11 As Spanish writer Victor Morales
Lezcano summarized Spain's course:
The changing position of Franco's government during World War II
from strict neutrality to non-belligerency to vigilant neutrality ... was
dictated by the perception of the development of the war and by the
resulting necessity to adjust Spain's relations with the Axis and Allied
powers. 12
Switzerland has been the European state most generally identified with the
practice of neutrality in its foreign relations. 13 Landlocked and {after June 1940)
surrounded by Axis-controlled territory, Switzerland could nonetheless ill-afford to
assume its neutrality would be respected during the Second World War. Forced by

Realpolitikto oblige Hitler, especially in providing critical transit routes between
Germany and Italy, the German dictator was nonetheless made aware that any
attempt to occupy Switzerland would result in the Swiss destruction of the three
Alpine tunnels, the Loetschberg, the Simplon and the St-Gotthard. The three
transalpine rail tunnels were of enormous strategic importance to the Axis. After
Italy's entry into the war in 1940, when the Royal Navy effectively shut off Italy's
normal channels of sea commerce, nearly all of the traffic formerly carried by ship,
especially coal, had to be sent through the Swiss tunnels. Raw material carried via
Switzerland's railroads represented 10% of the traffic in the last prewar year; by
1944, the same category of freight, led by coal, made up almost 90% of the total. 14

TI It should be noted that the tactic of delay was urged on him during the
period of heaviest German pressure on Spain, the summer and fall of 1940, by
Portugal's Salazar, whom Franco openly admired. Ibid, 258.
12

Victor Morales Lezcano, "Las Causas de la No Beligerencia Espanola,
Reconsideradas", Revista de Estudios lnternacionales, May 3, 1984, 609-631.
13

Christopher Hughes, Switzerland, London, 1975, 149.

14

Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 81.
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If Spain was the neutral that came closest to allying militarily with the Axis,
Sweden was the neutral which most narrowly avoided German occupation. Since
1870, strict neutrality had been raised to the level of a Swedish national doctrine,
but after World War I the Swedes decided to participate in the League of Nations.
The rise of Hitler and the disintegration of the League in the 1930s led to the
country in the summer of 1938 renouncing its obligations to participate in League
sanctions, the single self-imposed condition Sweden allowed on its otherwise
theoretical impartiality between British and German interests. Instead, Sweden
turned in the direction of greater inter-Nordic diplomatic cooperation based on
achieving and maintaining a common policy of neutrality. 15
The Wehrmacht's Plan Weseruebung, the operation which in the spring of
1940 resulted in the occupation of neutral Denmark and Norway, had also originally
included Sweden. Because two Swedish commodities were vital to Germany
maintaining its war-footing - ball bearings and high grade iron ore, both purchased
by the Reich in large amounts during Hitler's military build-up in the 1930s Germany could not allow any interruption in their delivery from Sweden. Stockholm
explicitly warned Berlin that invasion of its territory would result in the immediate
destruction of its iron-ore processing facilities.
A further Swedish consideration related to Norway's Atlantic coast, the only
easy access to which was across Swedish territory. After its neighbor's fall to Nazi
occupiers, Sweden would agree, in a storm of domestic and international criticism,
to German transshipments to Narvik, resulting in the ability of the Wehrmachtto
relatively securely maintain its forces in northern Norway.

10

Loenroth, Erik, "Sweden's Ambiguous Neutrality", Scandinavian Journal
of History, February 1977, 89-105.

7
The only British Commonwealth dominion not to militarily take up Britain's
cause in World War II was Ireland. The fact that Ireland's six northeastern counties
continued to comprise a part of the United Kingdom, a partition seen by Dublin as
British occupation of the North, was the single most important moral justification in
Irish prime minister Eamon de Valera's determination not to join Britain's war
against the Axis. In 1938, the government of Neville Chamberlain, a prime minister
genuinely anxious for good relations between Britain and Ireland, 16 in order to
assuage Irish nationalism let lapse the treaty by which Britain leased naval bases in
three Irish ports - the so-called Treaty Ports of Cobh, Lough Swilly and
Bereshaven. (He called the 1938 return of the Irish ports an "act of faith." 17)
Chamberlain assumed that in the event of war Dublin would re-lease them to
Britain. The British military chiefs of staff concurred with Chamberlain's
assessment that a British division would be required to hold each port if Ireland
were actively hostile, and that Britain's forward Atlantic sea lanes could always be
protected by the use of French instead of Irish ports. 18
To de Valera, the ports represented a major concern: foreseeing that
Europe was headed for war, he equally foresaw that Ireland would not be able to
maintain its neutrality if Britain had use of the ports. Accordingly, when war began
in September 1939, de Valera steadfastly refused to allow Britain's naval re-access
to the ports, a decision which in light of the immediate German submarine threat in
the North Atlantic meant a grave danger to shipping in England's southwestern
approaches. (The northern - Clyde and Mersey - approaches were protected by
16

Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 232.

17

Ibid, 234.

18

In June 1940, Churchill estimated it would take ten days to move a division
from England to Ireland. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War - Their
Finest Hour, Boston, 1949, 172.
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Ulster bases.) A proposal would be put forth from Whitehall in early 1941 for
Ireland to lease the bases to the still non-belligerent but pro-British United States.
But de Valera vetoed the plan as the breach of Irish neutrality it would have
represented to Germany. The prime minister reasoned that if either Britain orthe
United States were allowed into the ports, Germany would disregard Dublin's
protestations of neutrality and regard the entire island as a belligerent. 19
Furthermore, the former IRA leader believed that once Britain regained the ports'
use, it might never again leave. 20 Ironically, the fact of Irish partition became the
chief protection of Ireland's neutral status from British interference: if Britain had
had no Ulster bases from which to protect its shipping, a British occupation of
Ireland might very well have been implemented. 21
The last of Europe's neutrals was Turkey, the diplomatic skills of its leaders
representing the critical factor that kept that country out of the war. Turkey's
sympathy to the German cause was based chiefly on their joint hatred of Russia,
the Turk's most powerful traditional enemy. But the British naval presence in the
Mediterranean was the stimulus which finally convinced Ankara to negotiate a
middle way between the belligerent camps rather than actively join either's side. 22
The Turkish capital became a jousting ground, with a succession of Allied envoys
doing diplomatic battle with Germany's Franz von Papen, one of the Reich's most

m John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, Oxford,
1982, 242.
20

Ibid, 235.

~-

21

Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of
Wartime Cooperation and Post-War Change 1939-1952, London, 1958, 65.
22

Turkey's 1914-1918 debacle on the Central Powers' side was also vividly
remembered by Turkey's aging leadership.
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effective envoys as its ambassador in Ankara. 23 A tantalizing what-if regarding
Turkey is that if Franco's Spain had joined the Axis, a closed western entry to the
Mediterranean would have been the undoubted result. Thus much of the sting
would have been taken out of Britain's Mediterranean fleet, perhaps enough to
persuade Turkey to join Germany's fight against Russia in the summer of 1941.24
In addition to the fighting war, the belligerents waged an economic struggle,
and as a result all six neutrals would be held hostage by a vitally important Allied
weapon: the blockade. Though not directed against the neutrals themselves and
their own economic needs, it was these countries which represented the largest
potential holes in the economic barrier Britain and the United States built around
the Reich and the territory it controlled; to minimize these leaks in the barrier was a
major Allied effort in its relations with the neutrals.
Germany did not give the same emphasis to economic warfare as did Britain
and its allies, although it was able to successfully threaten Sweden with import
allowances over the transit issue (see p. 75). In the early war years, the victorious
Germans evidently saw little need to concern themselves with an attempt to
completely blockade the neutrals' strategic trade. In the later years, Germany lost
its ability to do so, and more pressing defense needs occupied its attention. 25
The threat of near-total embargo designed to force a neutral to halt trade
with Germany and Axis-controlled territory - theoretically if not always realistically

~ Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral - Great Britain and the Quest tor a
Turkish Alliance in the Second World War, Columbia, Mo., 1979, 217.
24

Hitler's concern that his armies should not seem weak to Turkey was one
of the reasons he wouldn't ordinarily allow tactical military retreats when the tide
turned against Germany in southern Russia; he continued to hope Turkey would
come in on the side of the Axis. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The
Undeclared War 1940-1941, New York, 1953, 112-ff.
25

Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 82-83.
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within the power of the Allies - had always to be considered in the neutral capitals,
and it was implicit in nearly all Allied diplomatic relations with these states; in the
next chapter we'll see how Allied ability and willingness to cut petroleum to Spain
would in 1943 and 1944 force Franco to finally halt Spain's tungsten exports to the
Axis. Cordell Hull justified the years of Allied economic warfare in a April 1944 radio
broadcast:
In the two years following Pearl Harbor, while we were mustering our
strength and helping to restore that of our Allies, our relations with
these neutral nations and their attitude toward our enemies were
conditioned by the position in which we found ourselves. We have
constantly sought to keep before them what they, of course, knew that upon our victory hangs their very existence and freedom as
independent nations ... we are not asking these neutral nations to
expose themselves to certain destruction when we ask them not to
prolong the war, with its consequences of suffering and death, by
sending aid to the enemy. 26
A complete Allied blockade of the neutrals was never undertaken, the
reasons essentially involving the retention of the moral high ground: extending
rights of belligerency to such lengths was, in 1939, an alien concept. What was of
perhaps more concrete concern was the realization that the neutrals' trade went
two ways, with both the Axis and with the Allies, and if the Allies stopped imports
from entering these countries, they couldn't very well expect to get exports out of
them. Before December 1941 there was also the not unimportant issue of U.S.
neutrality: if America's profitable trade with the belligerents had been grossly
interfered with by Washington and London, American isolationists would have
been handed an effective club with which to berate the Allied cause. 27
At the outset of the war, before Germany's spectacular continental victories
,~

in 1940, Britain negotiated import quotas called War Trade Agreements with Spain,
"2S Cordell Hull quoted in Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 13-14.
27

Ibid, 183.
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Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden; 28 Turkey, considered an ally, was treated
somewhat differently, and Ireland wasn't held to be a potential conduit of goods to
Germany. These agreements29 set quotas based on each countries' own needs,
measured against normal prewar net imports of each commodity; 30 products not
normally imported by the neutral state and from which Germany might benefit were
totally restricted. Each neutral agreed not to re-export goods allowed through the
blockade, but in 1941 and 1942, with German power at its zenith, the War Trade
Agreements were often violated by the neutrals. Britain's military position, and thus
its ground forces' ability to maintain any land blockade, was at a low point, so the
neutrals - particularly the Iberian states - sold to Germany in exchange of muchneeded goods, especially weaponry, rather than to Britain which because of its
own depleted stocks could offer only cash. 31
In the summer of 1940, Lisbon hedged coming to terms with Britain on a
quota for its oil needs. The Portuguese refused to set a tonnage amount which
satisfied the British Ministry of Economic Warfare that allowed imports would be
used domestically and not re-exported to Germany or Italy, both of which countries
Britain knew were willing to buy oil from Portugal for considerably more than
Portugal had had to pay for it. In February 1941, after the Royal Navy instituted an
embargo of oil into Portugal, Lisbon and London agreed to a figure of 78,000 tons

~These treaties recalled similar agreements between Britain and Europe's
neutrals during the 1914-1918 war. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, London,
1952, vol. 1, 7.
29

·~

They were set by a coordinated agency; the attempt at scattered
ministries negotiating separate agreements in the First World War had been a
failure. Ibid, 15.
30

Turkey's quotas were not formally set, but listed by "informal" quotas.

31

Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 33-40.
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per month, an increase over the 50,000 it had earlier been receiving. Britain also
extracted solemn assurances from Salazar that none would be re-exported. 32
Portugal also suffered the misfortune of having her colonies' products
subjected to Allied quotas. Angola and Mozambique produced far more than
Portugal could use domestically, but unfortunately most of the goods concerned fruit and other food products - were perishable, and thus routinely rotted on the
docks because shippers wouldn't run the risk of the destruction or seizure of their
ships by Allied naval vessels on reaching European waters. 33
The coercion used by the Allies to enforce their economic blockade against
the neutrals lay in their navies, but rather than guns, the navicert was the navies'
most potent weapon. Both Britain and the United States employed the system, the
latter beginning to do so many months before its active belligerency began. The
navicert worked as follows: if a given country wished to sell goods to a European
neutral, such as Argentina selling meat to Spain, or Venezuela oil to Portugal, that
country's agent would consult with the local British or American consul to
determine whether such a consignment was within the ration preset by the Allies
for the receiving nation. If it was, the consul would issue the navicert, allowing the
goods to pass through the Allied naval blockade guarding the sea lanes to the
neutral country; if it was not, no navicert was issued, and if the consignment were
still sent it would be subject to seizure by the Allied navy.
The navicert provided an assurance to the ship owners that their vessels
and cargoes wouldn't be seized as contraband as long as the navicert conditions
were adhered to, although the ships were often searched to make sure of such
adherence. British and American shipping agents around the world were
32

Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, New York, 1970, 173.

33

/bid, 174-175.
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purchased at enormously inflated prices by both the United States and Britain for
the purpose of keeping it out of German hands in a campaign of preemption.
During this period of intense wolfram supply and price inflation, the two
Iberian governments followed quite different policies regarding its mining and sale.
Ever-cautious where Portugal's neutrality was concern, Salazar had as his primary
concern the orderly disposal of his country's supplies. In consequence, he
intensified controls on both production and price in an effort to both restrain the
inevitable inflationary pressures attached to the bidding war between the
belligerents and to protect Portugal against the threat of military takeover of its
supplies by either side. Franco, who was less worried, limited neither production
nor prices, seemingly unconcerned about the inflationary effects or security risks
as long as the Spanish treasury was the prime beneficiary. Nor did he share
Salazar's concern that either side would risk a hostile Spain by threatening the
peninsula over this issue. 38
Because of the enormous profits involved - Portuguese prices increased
from $1100 a ton in 1940 to nearly $20,000 in 1941, despite Salazar's controls illegal production became the breeder of widespread corruption; mines nears the
Spanish border simply smuggled portions of their production into Spain for the
even greater profits that could be realized in the less-controlled Spanish market.
The effect of Portuguese policies, which included the stipulation that all domestic
producers channel their production through an official sales commissariat, was to
thwart Allied preemption of the mineral, regardless of Salazar's perhaps wellintentioned policy of even-handed protection of his country's economy. Germany

...

was able to buy nearly as much Portuguese ore as it wanted to transport by train to
steel manufacturers in the Reich, and thus represented the favored side in
38 Gordon,

The Hidden Weapon, 106.
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Salazar's arrangement, a situation which continued into 1943. Despite Allied efforts
to thwart Portuguese wolfram sales to the Reich, Portugal remained the larger of
Germany's two Iberian suppliers until June 1944, when Salazar felt he was freer to
submit to Allied demands to stop sales to Germany because of what he now
regarded as the weakened German retaliatory threat to Portugal. 39
In Spain, the Allied preemption policy ran into a different set of problems.
Because of increased domestic mining as well as the Portuguese smuggling of the
ore into the country to take advantage of Spanish prices and to thwart Salazar's
allocation rules, Spain by 1941 had greatly increased its wolfram mining. 40 The
major difficulty the Allies faced was obtaining Spanish pesetas with which to buy
wolfram, a problem which led to the transference of significant amounts of British
gold bullion into the Spanish treasury.
Finally, after July 1943, Germany's financial capacity to pay Spain's inflated
prices for the metal collapsed, and Franco now bowed to Allied demands to limit
wolfram sales to Germany at the same time not having to worry too much about
Germany's retaliatory capacity, German armies now on the retreat in both the
Mediterranean and eastern Europe. This same realization on the Allies' part led to
demands in November 1943 that Spain embargo al/wolfram to Germany, in return
the United States promising to increase goods quotas allowed to pass through its
naval blockade of Spain.
Germany - still not quite out of the picture - demanded that Spain supply it
with wolfram against the Civil War debt the latter owed, and which Franco agreed
despite Allied pressure to resist. In retaliation, the Allies embargoed all petroleum
into Spain, soon bringing the now virtually fuel-less country to its senses,
39

Ibid, 107-108.

40

Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 91.
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economically-speaking. Spain gave in to Allied demands in the spring of 1944.
Since Germany no longer received Spanish wolfram, the U.S. and Britain were free
to halt their Spanish purchases as well. 41
The wolfram war ended. Germany was forced to reduce the tungsten
percentage in even critical tool tips from the normal 10-18% to around 2-3%, which
necessitated slowing machinery speeds by up to 75%; tungsten tools in other vital
industries, such as coal mining, had to be foregone. There was also a near
abandonment of tungsten carbide cores in anti-tank ammunition, a deficiency to
which German military experts attached great significance. 42 The cessation of
Iberian supplies also forced the Germans to make the ore, from whatever source,
their principal cargo in running the general Allied embargo of Nazi Europe, at
enormous danger to its suppliers and in lieu of other desperately needed imports
those ships could have carried. 43
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CHAPTER II
THE NEUTRALS
SPAIN
"There is no country in Europe
which is so easy to overrun as Spain;
there is no country which is
more difficult to conquer."
Lord Macauley 1
Of the six neutrals in World War II, it was Spain, under the dictatorial
leadership of Francisco Franco, that would have presented the gravest danger to
the Allies had it joined the Axis. The Spanish position vis-a-vis the belligerents
arose most directly out of its own just-concluded civil war, but a key to
understanding Franco's Spain and its attitude toward the general European war
was that the Nationalist victors of the civil war considered Russia - not Germany - to
be the real enemy of the civilized world. Furthermore, they detested the liberalism
of the Western Alliance, the social doctrine they believed was responsible for
Spain's decline from its nineteenth century imperial power role. This latter issue
was magnified by Franco into a sort of recipe for isolation in his belief that Britain,
France and America would do their utmost to overthrow his regime, a belief borne
out by the pariah status assigned Spain after the war by the victorious Allies. 2
There is little question that Spain's foreign policy, as well as its goodwill, was
oriented toward Germany and Italy in 1939.3 Paradoxically though, perhaps the
1

John Gunther, Inside Europe, New York, Harper & Bros., 1940, 213.

2

Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 260.

3

Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime 1936-1975, Madison, 1987, 253.

18
least-recognized facet of Spain's relationship to the belligerents is the fact that the
Allied cause owed Franco an enormous debt for keeping his nation out of direct

partnership with Germany. It would have been a partnership giving Germany
control of Gibraltar - one of Britain's vitally important control points in its sea
blockade of goods bound for Axis countries as well as a key communications link
with India and the Orient. 4 British loss of the Mediterranean would have meant a
very different scenario for the European war. 5
At the end of June 1940 German tanks had reached the border between
France and Spain. Many in the British government thought the Germans had an
open road to Gibraltar. 6 Hitler and the OKW General Staff regarded Spain
unambiguously in the logic of their military aims: by bringing the country into the
war on the Axis side, they reasoned Franco would open his border to German
infantry and armored columns and permit them to march toward Gibraltar Britain's last toehold on the continent and the utterly critical guarantor of its ability
to keep the Mediterranean open to the Royal Navy.7 Once in Gibraltar, Hitler
planned to move his armies across the Strait into Spanish Morocco, and to
persuade Franco to cede to Germany one of its Canary islands to serve as as a Uboat base. To remunerate Spain, Germany would hand over parts of French North
Africa in compensation for both the island and for German occupation of the more
strategically important Spanish Morocco. In its final political configuration, Spain
4 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 29.
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itself would be virtually a German dominion and northern and middle Africa were to
come under permanent German suzerainty. 8
Franco's response in light of the Reich's overwhelming military capability
was to delay partnership with Germany for the longest time possible. Having lost
600,000 people, and with countless acres of productive land and its industrial
capacity crippled as a result of the three-year-long civil war, Spain's dictator knew
his country was in no position to enter the war on the Axis side as anything
approaching equality with Germany - or even of the rank of its Italian junior partnerto-be. Furthermore, if Spain were forced by unilateral German action to join the
Axis (the threat of an outright hostile German invasion of a resisting Spain was by
no means negligible in the summer of 19409), Franco wanted it delayed until the
last possible moment in the hope that Spain might gain maximum advantages in
terms of African spoils and run the least risk in terms of casualties and damage. To
help in his delaying tactics, from the war's outset Franco provided Germany with
valuable military assistance, from allowing German pilots to photograph Allied
shipping from Iberian airliners, to agreeing to permit the Reich's naval (mostly
submarine) and merchant vessels to use the Spanish ports of Santander, Vigo,
and Cadiz and harbors in the Canary Islands for refueling and resupply. The latter
were an especially important refueling point for this critically important arm of the
German war machine in the period before Germany's "milch cow" method of
resupplying submarines at sea was initiated in December 1941. 10
Long before the German armies had reached the Spanish border, Franco
was readying arguments against joining the Axis - a position he knew Hitler would
8 Beaulac, Silent Ally, 2.
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consider ungrateful in light of the assistance the Nazis had given Franco's rebel
forces in overcoming Spain's Republican government. Franco wrote to Hitler in

June 1940:
At the moment when the German armies, under your leadership, are
bringing the greatest battle in history to a victorious close, I would like
to express to you my admiration and enthusiasm ... when your
soldiers shared with us in [our] war against the same, although
concealed, enemies ... [However] the great upheavals which Spain
underwent in the three years of war, where to our losses and wear
and tear were added the innumerable losses inflicted in Red territory,
have put us in a difficult position .. .! do not need to assure you how
great is my desire not to remain aloof from your cares and how great
is my satisfaction in renderin~ to you at all times those services which
you regard as most valuable. 1
In this wily prose, Franco's real purpose was to lay the case for staying out of the
war. He believed that joining the conflict would merely constitute a continuation of
Spain's own deeply wounding civil war, a struggle that had not only left the nation's
economy in shreds but also its reputation ruined among the democracies because
of the support the Nationalists accepted from Europe's two leading fascist states. 12
In June 1940, Franco "assured" Germany of his willingness to join the Axis as a cobelligerent, but set an unacceptable list of demands he knew couldn't be met: in
addition to Gibraltar, he insisted French Morocco and the department of Oran in
Algeria be transferred to Spain, Rio de Oro and Spanish Guinea be enlarged, and
huge economic and military aid grants be given which Franco told Hitler were
absolutely necessary before the exhausted Spain could think of joining the
European war at Germany's side.
It was at the famous meeting of October 26, 1940 at Hendaye, on the
Atlantic border of France and Spain, that Hitler's grand strategy for Spain was
n Unsigned memorandum, Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler, Documents on
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checkmated by Franco. One of the demands he insisted be met before bringing
Spain into co-belligerency was the promise of extensive French African

possessions, a demand which if agreed to and then discovered by Vichy officials in
Africa would have almost certainly led to their abandonment of Petain's
government in favor of the Free French. A German diplomatic memorandum
stated that
there was the danger that, if the French were explicitly told they would
have to get out of certain African areas, the African possessions
would perhaps desert France, even with the concurrence of the
government of Vichy. 13
It was a risk Franco correctly judged Hitler wouldn't take. 14
From the summer of 1940 to the end of 1941 Franco was under
considerable domestic pressure to bring Spain into the Axis as a co-belligerent.
Not only was there a body of Falangists publicly calling for a Spanish declaration of
war against Britain, but a minority of party members personally opposed to Franco
was willing to join any cause designed to embarrass the Caudillo. 15 Another
source of internal difficulties was the major Spanish newspapers - Arriba and Diario
de Burgos were the most prominent - which caused Franco political

embarrassment by calling for a union, forced if need be, with Portugal. Their
editorials jingoistically wrote of the two countries' "sharing of the same soul." 16
These outbursts in important Spanish papers not only gave Portugal's Salazar
problems, they clearly were aimed at the more even-handed Portuguese policy of
13 Unsigned memorandum, Record of the Conversation Between the
Fuehrer and the Caudillo, in the Fuehrer's Parlor Car, at the Hendaye Railroad
Station on October 23, 1940, italics mine, DGFP, v. XI, 375.
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urging non-intervention in the war on Franco, 17 the latter favoring a "Good
Neighbor" policy not laced with the kind of Pan-lberianism that was highly
unpopular in Portugal. 18
During the summer of 1940 Franco attempted to sway Salazar from genuine
neutrality by getting him to sign a Hispano-Portuguese military pact that would
have had the effect of turning Lisbon into a kind of satellite of Madrid. Salazar
refused, agreeing merely to sign a treaty providing for "mutual consultation"
between the two Iberian nations in case of any foreign threat to either. 19 The treaty,
a Salazar success, was read by an irritated Berlin as a "fairly substantial" distancing
of mutual Iberian policy from the interests of the Axis. 20
The relationship between Spain and the Allies followed an often stormy
course, specifically in its American dealings. The U.S. government shared Britain's
goal of Spanish neutrality, and it became a major policy objective whose
maintenance was monitored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supervised by the
State Department. 21 The primary players in U.S./Spanish relations were, on the
American side, Alexander Weddell, the first ambassador to the new Nationalist
Spain from the United States, and the man who succeeded him in mid-1942,
Carlton Hayes. 22 While serving in Madrid, they interacted chiefly with Spanish
17 It speaks of Spain's internal political problems that Franco permitted the
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foreign ministers Juan Beigbeder (who was especially anxious to help preserve
Spain's neutrality by linking the country with Portugal's neutrality policy23), and
Ramon Serrano Sun er. The personalities of the two Spaniards determined to a
large extent the course of Washington's relations with Spain. 24
Especially after the fall of France, the chief concern of Washington paralleled
London's - that Franco would bring Spain into the war on the side of the Axis.
Although still neutral, the United States had become all but a co-belligerent with
Britain in the anti-German alliance, and the fear of an Axis strengthened by a
Spanish partner, with the inevitable loss of Gibraltar coming from such a
partnership, was President Roosevelt's primary consideration in initiating an
unprecedentedly blunt diplomatic line with Franco's government. 25
This dropping of normal diplomatic politesse came when Franco named as
Foreign Minister his brother-in-law and head of the Spanish Falange, the strongly
(many say notoriously) pro-Axis Ramon Serrano Sufier. 26 Ambassador Weddell
was instructed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to inform Serrano Suner that if
Spain sided with Germany against Britain, no additional U.S. humanitarian supplies
would be sent, a situation which because of Spain's critically low food reserves the
Spaniards knew would result in famine. The more conciliatory British position,
forwarded by its ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare, was to accept Serrano Suner's
assurances that Spain would remain a non-belligerent, although the Spanish
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minister told Hoare that its relation to Germany was merely the same as the U.S.'s
toward Britain, "except that Spain had nothing to give the Axis. "27 In any event,

London urged Washington to resume relief shipments, which by mid-1940 had
been nearly totally halted, reasoning that to allow Spain to succumb to widespread
starvation might push Franco to the point of co-belligerency with Germany. In
November 1940, Serrano Suner finally assured, and apparently convinced,
Weddell that Spain would resist "to the last man" a forced German invasion should
it come, and U.S. food shipments were resumed. 28
Spain was further enjoined in 1940 from going to war on the Axis side - when
German victory seemed most inevitable - by the realization that Britain's power to
retaliate, especially its naval power, was by no means yet negligible. A British
capture of the Canary or Balearic islands was held by Madrid to be a likely British
move in the event of Spain joining the Axis. Another may have been a landing on
Spain's northern coast, where the British might try to join forces with locally strong
Asturian communists. It was clear that the Royal Navy would totally embargo a
belligerent Spain from all overseas supplies, and further that the United States
would fully support Britain in such a move. 29
One of the arguments put forward by Hitler to Franco in urging Spanish
cooperation in an attack on Gibraltar was the reasoning that once Britain lost
Gibraltar, Spain's Mediterranean coast would be safe from naval and economic
warfare, and Spain would thus have only its Atlantic coast to contend with in the
war with Britain. Hitler promised to protect this front with German dive bombers,
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which "experience has shown are more effective than heavy coastal batteries. "30
Germany reasoned that once Britain lost Gibraltar, the former would attempt to
transfer its power to the Canaries by seizing a naval base there, in which
eventuality Germany further promised Spain support in thwarting such an
attempt. 31
In 1940, it was assumed that a Britain without Gibraltar would consider the
Canaries, Spain's Atlantic island chain off the African coast, its best base from
which to regain some control over the approaches to the western entrance to the
Mediterranean. 32 But Carlton Hayes, Weddell's successor as American
ambassador in Madrid, actively tried to dissuade either the U.S. or Britain from
seizing these islands, a move which the State Department informed Hayes was
under active consideration but which Hayes believed would be counterproductive. 33 In light of Hayes' warning that Franco could still be pushed into the
Axis if the Allies threatened Spanish soil (which Franco - and Spanish law - held the
Canaries to be), Roosevelt gave assurances to the Spanish dictator-34 that the Allies
had no intention to occupy the Canaries, a possibility Franco still thought existed.
Roosevelt now knew that there was little likelihood of Hitler being able to take
Gibraltar without Spanish acquiescence. 35
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Early in the war Franco and Serrano Suner recognized that if Spain didn't
join the Axis while Spain could still be of critical strategic importance to Hitler, it
might not be able to profit from Europe's coming "New Order." Franco worried that
to wait until Britain was occupied might be disastrous to Spain's future. Yet while
the German economy was self-sufficient in the months between the fall of France
and the invasion of the Soviet Union, Spain's economy was not - and actions by the
still-powerful Royal Navy could devastate it. 36 For the time being, and to Britain's
advantage, Franco continued to prevaricate. The British ambassador in Madrid,
Sir Samuel Hoare, described Franco in May 1941 as "the Brer Rabbit of dictators.
He lies very low, often so low and so long that people think he is dead or asleep. "37
Though Franco himself refused to give assurances to Roosevelt that Spain
would absolutely remain neutral, he continued through 1941 to stress that his
country was in no position to join the Axis as a co-belligerent. Despite the
Caudillo's antipathy to the democracies, the American ambassador advised
Washington that food shipments to Spain should continue - a course the U.S.
government followed even in the face of large parts of the American public
indignant at the notion of supplying a regime it regarded as having been brought to
power on the wings of the Luftwaffe and which still publicly and vociferously
supported the German side in the war. 38

~Ibid, 270.
37

Ibid, 270.

38 The

United States continued to be concerned about relatively minor
matters as well: as late as July 1943, Ambassador Hayes was warning the Spanish
Foreign Ministry "if the Spanish Government is unable to control. .. the pro-Axis
[press], my Government will of necessity be compelled to re-examine its attitude
towards Spain ... " Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, 1943, vol. ii,

610.

27
After the U.S. entry into the war, the more significant - and generally the
harshest - Allied influence exerted on Franco shifted from London to Washington.
More and more the threat of withholding navicerts - compulsory after 1940 - came
to represent the primary diplomatic threat to ensure Spanish non-belligerency. 39
There is no certainty that American supplies were the decisive factor in Franco's
decision to stay out of the European conflict, but they must have to a considerable
degree weighed in that decision. In 1940 Germany could not supply the necessary
foodstuffs and fuel to Spain. 40 Franco told Hitler that in the absence of such
supplies Spain could not fight a long war without risking disastrous famine and
collapse of internal order. It is clear that the exigencies of Spain's domestic needs
and the realities of Anglo-American economic power created a relationship
between Spain and the United States that was, according to historians William
Langer and Everett Gleason "an important contributory factor in keeping Spain
from closer identification with the Axis." 41
By the last half of 1941, Franco had good reasons to feel vindicated in his
caution in the matter of co-belligerency with the Axis. Though German successes
remained seemingly spectacular, the Reich was far from a final victory over either
the West or the Soviet Union. And Franco understood that Spain owed its escape
from greater famine misery not to Hitler's Europe, but to overseas supplies allowed
through the blockade. Furthermore, the Caudillo had his hands full at home as he
continued to experience political problems that were beginning to put cracks in the
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foundations of his authority. They came from, on one side, the disaffected and
disappointed monarchists who had since 1939 hoped for a royal restoration, and,
on the other, from the over-powerful Falanga that believed Spain was "abandoning"
the debt it owed Germany. 42
By late 1942 Franco himself was apparently coming to the conclusion that
Germany was passing its military zenith, 43 and thus his country would probably not
have to honor the "promises" of co-belligerency that he had made to Hitler in
1940.44 Allied concerns thereafter centered not so much on the issue of Spain itself
actually joining the Axis, but on the strategic value of Spain's Canary Islands, as
well as any possible Spanish interference with the North African landings, and,
mostly for symbolic reasons, Franco's Blue Division then fighting alongside the
Germans on the Russian front. 45 The Allies clearly made known to Franco their
continuing lack of intention to occupy Spain, an occupation dismissed by U.S. and
British war planners as an overly-costly expansion of the European conflict. 46
Probably the single greatest mistake of Franco's diplomacy was the failure
to return to a position of genuine neutrality in 1942, after the American entry into the
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war. But Franco, in a "sophisticated but improbable piece of casuistry" 47 viewed
the war in Europe as two conflicts. One was between Germany and the Allies, in
which Spain was neutral (although until 1943 or 1944 he didn't think his
authoritarian regime could survive a German defeat48). The other was between
Russia (which was a Western ally, regardless of Franco's contorted thinking) and
Germany, in which Spain was anything butneutral. A Russian victory in this war
was, in the clear consensus of his biographers, regarded by the Caudillo as the
deathknell of Christian Europe: after the three-year-long slaughter in which Spain
finally and overwhelmingly defeated the Moscow-backed Republic, his and his
party's hatred of communism and the Soviet Union was visceral. This had been
one of the justifications for sending the Blue Division to Germany, although the
Division was, according to Willard Beaulac, primarily intended as a relatively
inexpensive gesture to demonstrate friendship to Hitler and thus keep at bay the
possibility of actually having to join the Axis. 49 Franco also reasoned Britain and
the United States would look on the "gesture" as doing relatively little to harm their
cause. Sent to the Russian front just six days after the German invasion, the
Division consisted of 18,000 Spanish volunteers under the command of General

Agust~ Muhoz Grandes. 50 (East German historian Otfried Dankelmann notes that
the Blue Division was, however, offered before it was requested. 51 ) Franco justified
the Division in a speech to National Council (the wartime Cortes), characterizing it
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as a token payment for the "debt of blood" owed by Spain to its German and Italian
"Axis comrades." The gesture unsurprisingly resulted in a furthering tightening of
Allied military supplies to Spain. 52
According to Stanley G. Payne, long into the war Franco had little doubt as
to whom the eventual victor would be: Payne writes that the Caudillo continued to
be convinced of a German victory until mid-1944, although the depth of his faith
had "slowly eroded. "53 After Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Western Europe in the spring
and summer of 1940, Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano54 had put pressure on
Serrano Suher to change the Spanish position from one of theoretical neutrality to
"non-belligerency." Franco's agreement and subsequent protestation that Spain's
policy remained essentially unchanged rang expectedly hollow to Allied ears. In
fact, the character of Spanish-Axis relations over the next year and a half made it
clear that Franco's sympathies lay unmistakably in an Axis victory over the Soviet
Union - coupled with a stand-off between Germany and the Allies.
The expansion of the European war into a world war in December 1941 was
the event that allowed Franco to breathe easier in terms of German pressure on
Spain to join in its war against Britain. Though Hitler continued for a while to talk
about eventually taking Gibraltar and blocking the western end of the
Mediterranean to the Royal Navy (an interest he never brought to his staff's plans
to seize the Suez Canal and cut off access to the eastern Mediterranean), the
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vision evaporated with the first winter of the Russian War. 55 When Hitler's singlemindedness switched to the Russian campaign in June, followed with the American
entry into the war in December, Iberia became a relative backwater.
If Franco had returned to genuine neutrality in 1942 - recalled the Blue
Division, 56 halted sales of wolfram to both sides, given firm and verifiable
assurances that imports would not be transshipped to Germany - Spain's post-war
international position would have been greatly improved. 57 Even his fear of not
surviving an Allied victory was ironically misguided as a justification to tilt toward the
Axis: Franco's delaying tactics so infuriated Hitler that he vowed to eventually "get
even" with the Spanish dictator, a prospect that if Hitler had been in a position to
implement wouldn't have boded well for the Caudillo in an Axis-dominated
Europe. 58 Though his consolidation of power during the war years was vital to his
state's ability to survive the external isolation following the war, a U.S./British front
friendlier to Franco after the war would have served his corporate state far better. 59
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It is difficult today to make one's thinking about Franco's actions in World
War II conform to the realities that Spain had to face during what was for it an

exceedingly dangerous period. Though Stanley Payne cogently argues that Spain
was "relatively" neutral only during the early war years (1939 and 1940), when a
German victory was still uncertain, and the late phase of the war (1944 and 1945),
when it was no longer possible, and in between was an active supporter of Axis
victory60 , other observers who were in responsible positions in Spain -Willard L.
Beaulac, 61 perhaps most convincingly - paint a far different picture, one in which
Franco's overriding desire to keep out of the war, despite his public ideological
utterances and concessions to Germany, redounded to the favor of the Allies. If
this latter view is the one which Franco wanted to be remembered for after the war,
his detractors in turn respond that had Hitler met his price in the summer or fall of
1940, Franco would most certainly have taken up arms as an active Axis member.
Payne writes that it was Hitler, not Franco, who made the decision that Spain would
stay out of the war: the cost of Spanish participation wasn't worth the opposite cost
of alienating Vichy France by depriving it of its African territory to pay Franco's
price. 62
The results seem best to be weighed not by the ideological sympathy
toward Hitler and Mussolini, but of the concrete results of Franco's policies in the
Second World War. Had Spain joined the Axis as a full co-belligerent, Gibraltar
would have, in all probability, been lost and the Mediterranean War would have
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been immensely more difficult for the Allied cause, both before and after direct
American participation in the conflict. The North African landings would have been
infinitely more formidable with Spain serving as a giant German base from which
the Luftwaffe would have resisted the Allied landings. Certainly an Allied victory in
the European war would have been greatly prolonged, if it would have been
possible at all.
In a speech to the House of Commons on May 25, 1944, Churchill noted the
effects of the Spanish policy - not of Franco's pro-Axis propaganda but of the
reality and results of his actions:
There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to German blandishments
and pressure ... our burden would have been much heavier. In the
dark days of the war the attitude of the Spanish Government in not
giving our enemies passage through Spain was extremely helpful to
us. It was especially so at the time of the North African liberation ... !
must say I shall always consider a service was rendered ... by Spain
not only to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire and
Commonwealth, but to the cause of the United Nations. 63
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PORTUGAL
"It always costs more to
buy a man of principle."
David L. Gordon, of Salazar64
The principal issues in the relationship between the belligerents and
Portugal during World War II were wolfram and the Azores; the major points of the
first issue were discussed in the first chapter. The second will be a chief topic of
this section.
Dr. Antonio Salazar, who during World War II ran the Portuguese
government with near-ironclad authority, saw the war primarily as a threat to
Portugal and its colonial interests - the larger moral and political issues involved
being, according to his biographers, entirely secondary. 65 Just as none of the
wartime neutrals was genuinely "neutral", so it was with Portugal; in, for example,
its vitally important wolfram dealings with the Axis and the Allies, the former
received fully 75% of the ore, the latter only 25% of the total production between
1939 and 1945 - this despite loud and long protestations of even-handedness
toward the opposing blocs. 66 Numerous other signs of pro-Axis sentiment in
Portugal could be seen: unequal censorship of German and Anglo-American
propaganda, or the observation that many of the country's social institutions were
openly modeled on the fascist pattern. Nonetheless, Salazar's state did make a far
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Ironically, while Germany never had to repay the unpaid portion of the
funds owed Portugal for the ore, Britain's war debt to Portugal - mostly for the
wolfram, which was sold at the rate of 300 pounds sterling for 16,000 tons each
year - was after the war used by Salazar to pay for the take-over of the British
owned commercial interests in the Portuguese colonies; officially, however, Britain
held that the money was well-spent in that it represented an important contribution
to Britain's preemptive economic campaign against Germany. Ibid, 92-93.
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greater effort to achieve something approaching true neutrality than did Franco
until late in the war. 67 With serious and conflicting pressures from both sides,
Salazar engaged in a "six-year piece of tightrope diplomacy and relentless
bargaining" 68 that at times infuriated both sides but at war's end left Portugal intact and not nearly the international pariah that Franco's Spain had become.
The history of Anglo-Portuguese relations was a major factor in creating this
distinction between the two Iberian states. Though the English-Portuguese alliance
went back six centuries, the Methuen Treaty of 1703 underlay the concrete
economic basis of the relationship. This treaty ensured that Portugal would enjoy
with Britain "a greater trading balance than any other country whatsoever", making
their relationship a very much closer one at the outbreak of World War II than that
between Britain and Spain. 69 But foreseeing the coming European conflict, Salazar
in the late 1930s attempted to bolster his country's position by broadening its
friendships into a wider circle of potential allies - particularly Brazil and Spain - in
case of a serious Axis threat to Portugal's independence of action. 70
At the outbreak of war in September 1939, Britain didn't try to use its special
relationship to bring Portugal into active co-belligerency; in fact, Portugal's
neutrality at the outbreak of war was considered an advantage by the British. Had
Salazar entered the war against Germany, the British government foresaw the
strong possibility of Lisbon provoking a German invasion, which would have in turn

57

Ibid, 93.

68

Kay, Portugal, 122.

69

Figueiredo, Portugal, 94.

°

7

Kay, Portugal, 121. Salazar also reached out for stronger contacts with
the Holy See at this time.

36
given Salazar the prerogative to invoke the Alliance provisions and force Britain to
fight for Portugal's territorial integrity. 71
With war closing in, Salazar received a not-too-subtle suggestion from
Franco that Portugal's position in the upcoming conflict should be one of neutrality
- that it should avoid favoring the British side. The German Charge d' Affaires in
Portugal cabled the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on August 25, 1939:
I learn from a most reliable source that the Spanish ambassador [the
Caudillo's brother, Nicolas Franco y Bahamonde] inquired of Minister
President Salazar yesterday whether Portugal would remain neutral
in a general conflict. Salazar gave him to understand that he would
do everything to ensure that Portugal remains neutral, but did not
give him any binding declaration. Thereupon Franco's Ambassador
gave him to understand that Spain would be compelled to revise her
policy towards Portugal, if Portugal did not maintain her neutrality. 72
As we've seen, some of the more extreme elements of the Falange advocated an
Iberian union, with or without Portugal's compliance: the influential Diario de

Burgos, published in the city that had been the Nationalist headquarters in the Civil
War, ominously editorialized on November 15, 1939: "without the meddling of Great
Britain, the union of Spain and Portugal would have been achieved because it is a
geographical necessity. "73
Five days later, on August 30, the same German official reported to Berlin
that he was told by Salazar's ambassador to Madrid that he had instructions to
inform the Spanish government that Portugal "would try to remain neutral as long
as possible, but would probably not be able to withstand excessive British pressure

71 When the threat of a German invasion of Portugal seemed imminent in

1940, Britain suggested to Salazar that his army put up only a token resistance
while moving the government to the Azores, and Salazar did begin strengthening
his military garrison in those islands. Ibid, 152 and 161.
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in the long run, especially in view of her [Portugal's] colonies." The following day,
Ribbentrop wired his legation in Lisbon that Germany was

determined, should hostilities break out, to refrain from any
aggressive act toward Portugal.. .and to respect Portuguese
possession, if Portugal maintains an impeccable neutrality towards
us in any future conflict. Only if this condition should, contrary to our
expectation, not be fulfilled, would we naturally be compelled ...to
protect our interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the
situation then prevailing might dictate. 74
It would, however, soon be Salazar who would be urging Franco to stay out
of the conflict for Iberia's sake. 75 Salazar announced on October 9, 1939 that
Germany had offered through diplomatic channels to respect Portugal's neutrality,
and furthermore that Great Britain did not wish to invoke any obligations under the
historic Anglo-Portuguese alliance in respect of Portugal entering the war. Britain's
position as conveyed by its ambassador in Lisbon stated that the country's
neutrality was the best way to serve British and Portuguese national interests. The
British envoy in Lisbon, Sir Walford Selby, reported to London that he believed that
"Salazar was fundamentally loyal to the Alliance", and that he "would answer the
call to [co-belligerency with Britain] if it were made on the grounds of dire
necessity. "76
Even though Salazar held that Germany represented a bastion against
communism, hatred for which he felt fully as strongly as Franco, the evidence is
that the Portuguese government and people essentially supported the the Allied
side, fearing that a British loss in the war would result in a Germanification of
Europe and a consequent loss of Iberia's independence. 77 Nevertheless, Germans
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in Portugal very successfully impressed the Portuguese upper classes as well as
the organized youth movement with the Nazi point of view: though not necessarily

embracing Hitler's methods, Portugal's upper social strata favorably compared
Germany's orderly society and strong economy with the memory of poverty and
social discord from which Salazar was slowly bringing the country. 78
In a sense, Portugal was at war's outbreak tied to Britain because of its
colonial empire and their trade and investment relationship. Throughout the
nineteenth century, British naval power had protected most of Portugal's overseas
possessions from foreign encroachment, which had been the primary reason for
Portugal entering the First World War on the Allied side. Many of its colonies were
in close physical proximity to substantially stronger British possessions and nearly
all were strategically important to Britain's war effort - and there was an implied
British threat if they remained off-limits in that effort. 79
Salazar had had reason to mistrust British intentions in the late thirties, when
leading members of the Chamberlain government had proposed a plan giving
Germany economic rights and possibly even "living space" carved out of
Portuguese Angola and the Belgian Congo, a proposal that was, of course,
shelved after September 1939. 80 But with the onset of war the Portuguese dictator
believed a British loss would still likely mean a German takeover of its African
possessions and thus the end of the enormous financial advantages its African
empire brought home. If he voluntarily allied Portugal with Spain in military
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partnership with Germany in the hope of finessing Hitler into letting Portugal's
African possessions remain Portuguese, the result would have been, in Salazar's
judgment, an eventual British invasion of Iberia and the collapse of his regime. 81 It
was from this quandary that Salazar urged Franco to remain neutral. Though the
precise effect of Salazar's advice to Franco is disputed among historians, it should
be noted that when Franco had the least reason to deny Hitler's pleas that Spain
militarily join the Reich in the summer and fall of 1940, the Spanish dictator, then
coming under Salazar's most insistent protestations against belligerency, kept his
country neutral.
Though it would be an over-simplification to credit Salazar's influence alone
for keeping Franco neutral, 82 substantial credit in this regard should nonetheless
be given the Portuguese leader. The assurances of Iberian military solidarity
Salazar proffered Franco, and the link Portugal represented between Spain and the
Allies, also would help allay Franco's fears of Spain being used by the Allies as a
site for future European landings: the promise that Salazar made of neutrality went
a long way in 1940 and 1941 toward relieving Franco of fears of an Allied invasion
of Iberia, one Franco thought would be directed primarily at Spain even though it
might have involved an initial landing in Portugal. 83
Unknown to the Portuguese, the British or the Americans, Germany had
decided in late 1940 to indefinitely postpone its naval plans to seize the Azores, the
most strategically important of Portugal's possessions. 84 Hitler judged that such a
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naval operation would draw-off an unacceptably large portion of his naval forces
then engaged in destroying merchant shipping supplying Britain, and ordered the
cessation of plans to occupy the islands. 85 But as late as May 1941, Hitler was
apparently still hazily looking forward to eventually gaining a long-range bomber
base in the Azores, saying as much to Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who
responded with the same advice as that tendered at all earlier mentions of the
subject - that at no foreseeable date could the German navy militarily hold the
islands or keep them adequately supplied. 86
Germany did, however, develop a plan outlining a response to a British
invasion of Iberia. 87 A May 1941 directive to the Army High Command from
General Franz Halder noted that in the event of the German army being "tied down
in the eastern theater of war in the summer of 1941" that it should
not be excluded that England ... will try ... to create for herself a new
continental position on the Iberian peninsula, with the aim of
preventing Spain from joining the Axis Powers, compensating for the
loss of prestige she has suffered, and offering the U.S.A. promising
conditions for her entry into the war ... A landing in the Portuguese
ports is to be expected primarily rather than in the ports of northern
Spain. Portugal will resign herself, under protest, to an English
landing. 88
The directive went on to outline in Operation Isabella the means by which the

Wehrmachtwould respond by driving out the British force.
Portugal's neutrality, already more nearly total than any of the other
neutrals, 89 was important and useful to both sides, and thus restrained the
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opposing belligerents in whatever occupation plans they had for Portugal or its
colonies. If Portugal had become absolutely vital to one side or the other, the

probability is that it would have been invaded. But the fact that both sides were free
to come and go in wartime Portugal made it extraordinarily useful as an entry point
for Europe, with, for example, the Lisbon-based Pan American Clipper flights
serving both the Allies and the Axis - ironically, many believed, in equal measure. 00
Lisbon was also between 1940 and 1945 one of the world's major financial
markets, its money black market an undeniable asset to both sides. 91
Furthermore, Portugal's capital became the Red Cross' chief European distribution
port. Less measurable perhaps but still noteworthy is the fact that the city and its
outskirts represented Europe's brightest and most normal urban landscape:
To travellers from countries at war, Portugal seemed an incredible
oasis of peace and prosperity: no blackout, no ration cards till [late]
in the war; shops full of food and luxuries, for those who could afford
to buy them; hotels full of wealthy refugees killing time till they could
get a place in the Pan-American Clipper; a skulking Rlace for spies
(real, or more often fancied) of all the nations at war. 92
Salazar strongly continued to believe his country's only chance to come out
of the European conflict unweakened and undamaged was to achieve and
maintain complete neutrality, 93 and just as strongly held that Portugal's future was
inextricably tied to that of Spain: if Spain either joined the Axis, or was invaded by
either belligerent side, Portugal would perforce be swept into the fray regardless of
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the correctness of its behavior as a neutral. 94 Even after 1941, Salazar continued
to hold that it would be an easy leap for Germany to move into Portugal with the
rest of a Nazi-occupied Iberia. And a German-dominated Iberian Atlantic coastline
was known to have been coveted by the German navy, though Hitler is reported to
have always shown more interest in the Portuguese Atlantic island possessions
than he did in the Portuguese mainland. 95 As a cornerstone of Portugal's foreign
policy designed to keep Spain neutral, he continued unabated through 1944 to
counsel patience to Franco. 96 But Salazar always recognized Franco's underlying
fear - both dictators well knew what it would mean to their regimes if communism or
communist-supported regimes were established in Iberia as a result of a German
loss of the war. Salazar could neither understand Britain's moral antipathy to
Franco's Spain - even in light of its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact - nor the
British failure to see that country as a barrier to such a political future for all of
Europe. 97
Portugal might have had its own version of Spain's Blue Division fighting
alongside the Wehrmachtin Russia if a proposal German Ambassador Huene
made to Salazar had come to fruition. In a telegram dated July 2, 1941, Huene
reported to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that
in the course of today's conversation with Salazar the talk turned to
the establishment of a corps of Spanish volunteers to fight
Bolshevism [the Blue Division was at the time being organized in
Spain] and to the question of carrying out a similar demonstration in
Portugal. I informed Salazar that we received daily applications from
Portuguese to be taken into the German army... Salazar explained
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that...in Spain it was somewhat different...that Spain had a debt of
gratitude to pay for the help in the Civil War. 98
Salazar managed to disengage himself thus, and said he would "perhaps" organize
a "Portuguese Legion" demonstration on behalf of the German fight on the Russian
front. Huene's response was that even this gesture would find a "strong response
not only in Germany but all over the world." The subject was apparently dropped,
except when it was raised one more time by Huene in October, which met with
Salazar responding only that he hoped Huene didn't want an immediate reply.
Nothing further came of the idea of Portuguese volunteers fighting Germany's
fight. 99
Portugal's relationship to the United States between 1939 and 1945 was
much less stressful than Spain's - though because of the strategic political
considerations involving its Atlantic island possessions, the Portuguese professed
to fear the Allies' intentions concerning the islands nearly as much as they did
those of Germany. The Salazar government was held by Western opinion to be far
less odious than that of Franco, not because it was any kind of a model Westernstyle democracy but because it had neither been helped into power by Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy nor had it emanated from a military coup. But both
before and after its entry into the war, the U.S./Portuguese relationship centered
particularly on the inflammatory issue of the Azores, the islands whose whose
utilization as an anti-submarine facility the British considered especially critical.
Before December 1941, President Roosevelt constantly brought diplomatic
pressure on Salazar to lease one of the islands to Britain, and even threatened,
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through Cordell Hull to Portugal's Ambassador Bianchi in Washington, American
occupation if Germany were seen to make any moves in their direction. 100
In May 1941, Senator Claude Pepper gave a speech in the Senate
advocating American occupation of the Azores on the basis that Hitler was known
to regard them as a useful base from which Germany could launch air strikes
against New York with an as-yet undeveloped long-range bomber. 101 Portugal
was, understandably, indignant over Pepper's speech, and a series of notes from
Lisbon to Washington was immediately initiated in which Portuguese neutrality for

all Portuguese soil was emphasized. In spite of the fact that Roosevelt declared the
Azores to be a part of the western hemisphere and thus under the protection of the
Monroe Doctrine, thereby "justifying" a preemptive occupation to safeguard
America from air attack, Hull was nonetheless authorized to assure Salazar that
Portuguese sovereignty would not be infringed. The assurance evidently was
given on the grounds that good relations with this useful neutral were more
important than preempting an unlikely German occupation attempt on the
islands. 102
It was in July 1941 that the Germans apparently decided that a unilateral
American intervention in the war - taking the Azores - was not in the United States'
interests. In a telegram dated July 20, 1941, the German charg~ in Washington
wired the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that
according to all indications President Roosevelt has postponed for
the moment his intention to occupy the the Azores ....This change in
the President's opinion certainly was decisively influenced ... by
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reports which were heeded here regarding a strengthening of the
Portuguese garrisons on the Azores. 103
After the fall of France in June 1940, when war appeared perilously close for the
Iberian peninsula, Salazar had ordered the strengthening of the Portuguese army
from 40,000 men to 80,000 men, in addition to new colonial manpower levies, most
of which increases were sent to the vulnerable Atlantic islands. 104 Though at the
time of Pepper's speech the American army's offensive combat strength was
"negligible", an assessment General George Marshall conveyed to Roosevelt when
a move against the Azores was still being officially considered, there is no evidence
that "strengthened Portuguese garrisons" would actually have held off an American
occupation if Roosevelt decided that essential U.S. security interests demanded
it.105

Later evidence, a German document, seems to question the interpretation:
a German Political Office interoffice memorandum dated September 30, 1941, and
based on reports from the Luftwaffe Attach~ in Lisbon, reported that
the task of the Portuguese armed forces (which it [Portugal] no
longer intends to strengthen to any substantial degree) was, first of
all, to protect the islands and colonies until a greater military power
could come to the aid of Portugal. The troops on the Atlantic islands
could hold the islands from 3 to 4 days against the attack of a major
power. Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality. In case of an
attempt to land by English or American troops she would call on
Germany for help. In case of an invasion by Germaw or Spain on
the other hand she would call on England for help. 1
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In February 1942, Franco warned Salazar that he had information that the British
were going to try to overthrow him in preparation for occupying the Atlantic islands;
the Caudillo promised Salazar Spanish help in such an event, subject only to
reciprocity from Portugal should Spain be attacked. Salazar reportedly didn't
believe such were Britain's intentions. 107
Though Iberia itself began to recede in importance after the United States
entered the war, the Azores did not. Allied shipping was still subject to devastating
losses from submarines in the Atlantic, and the limited-range aircraft of the time
were not able to attack the German submarines effectively from available
continental bases. Not only would a more southerly, and thus presumably safer,
shipping route be opened to the Allies, but naval escorts would have a refueling
station and the aircraft from the islands would be an effective weapon against the
U-boat threat to the convoys. 108 So where U.S. diplomatic efforts failed, the British
decided to go forward - by asking rather than demanding, and in very polite
diplomatic language, that Portugal cede to the Allies an Azore base. 109
As long as substantive danger of a German invasion had hung over Salazar,
he had hesitated to compromise Portuguese neutrality. But after the Torch
landings and Iberia's apparent safety from future German attack, in August 1943 he
finally gave in, not to the importunate Americans, but to the British. Salazar justified
this obviously huge hole in Portugal's neutrality policy by invoking its ancient treaty
obligations to Britain. Nonetheless the United States continued to threaten to take
the Azores by force while these negotiations with Britain inched forward, the U.S.
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ambassador archly informing the Portuguese foreign minister that "small nations
depend on an Allied victory [too]." 110
The German reaction to this reversal in Portuguese policy was noted
succinctly by Goebbels in a diary entry: "Unfortunately [Salazar] has lost faith in us
to some extent." For good measure, he added that "the same is true of Franco.
The dictators would do far better if they openly took sides with us, for if our side
does not win, they are lost anyway." 111 In hindsight, Goebbels' prediction was
erroneous, but in light of the attitudes that operated in both Iberian states even as
late as 1943, it was assumed that if Germany did lose the war, both Iberian
dictators would also fall.
German Foreign Office records indicate that on May 14, 1943 Hitler finally
decided that any kind of an Iberian invasion for the purpose of taking Gibraltar was
no longer possible. The German dictator understood by this time that Franco
would not enter the war at his side, his Spanish counterpart judging (correctly) that
German military forces, while still lethal, were now simply too much consumed in
the Russian war to be able to field a force capable of breaking through Spain or
Portugal against the combined opposition of those countries' governments. Both
Portugal and the Allies evidently came to the same conclusion at around the same
time, and the realization in Lisbon that Germany no longer presented an
overwhelming danger to Portugal was what caused Salazar to acquiesce to Allied
demands regarding the Azores. Though he insisted that Portugal remained legally
neutral, the move signaled the real end to all significant Portuguese concessions to
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German war aims except that Portuguese wolfram would continue to go to
Germany for another year. 112
The Royal Navy arrived in the Azores in October 1943. Immediately the
American ambassador in Lisbon demanded that the United States be allowed to
station a 10,000 man garrison on the islands. (For the time, the demand was
ignored.) Britain had promised not only the maintenance of Portuguese
sovereignty in the islands, but that it would remove its personnel at war's end. It
also promised to come immediately to Portugal's military rescue if Germany should
invade mainland Portugal because of this breach in Portuguese neutrality. The
British further vowed, somewhat disingenuously, that this granting of Azores
facilities in no way decreased its respect for Portugal's neutrality "on the European
mainland." In payment for the bases, Britain supplied Portugal with war materiel
worth 15 million pounds sterling, meant to substantially increase Portugal's
defensive military capabilities. In the end, Germany took no retaliation on Portugal
over the Azores. 113
For somewhat longer, Salazar maintained that he could not give the United
States what he had given Britain only because of treaty obligations. 114 Finally,
Salazar gave in, but only on the condition that the Americans operate as an arm of
the British force, and that American aircraft be marked with both U.S. and British
insignia. As of July 1944, American naval squadrons were finally based in the
Azores. 115
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The granting of the Azores facilities to the Allies did much to assuage U.S.
indignity over the continued sale of Portuguese wolfram to Germany. This last
attempt at even-handedness Salazar felt was necessary to forestall German
bombings of Portuguese cities: after the agreement with Britain over the islands,
the Portuguese nervously awaited Luftwaffe bombers for several weeks. 116
The political effects of the Second World War on Portugal were similar to
those experienced by Spain, in that the Salazar regime was required in the postwar world to discard some of its less acceptable features of its authoritarian regime
- less acceptable by the standards of the western democracies - and replace them
with at least some of democratic standards of the states which, on the non-Soviet
side of the Grand Alliance, won the war. Although the changes were perhaps more
cosmetic than substantive - fascist salutes became less conspicuous, Salazar
replaced his desk photograph of Mussolini with one of the British monarch, and he
declared his state not "corporate" but "corporative", the latter distinction a fine
one 117 - the result for Portugal was a step toward greater pragmatism and fewer of
the repressive policies that had marked Salazar's pre-war domestic politics.
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SWITZERLAND
"Of all the neutrals, Switzerland
has the greatest right to distinction."
Winston Churchill 118
Since 1815, 119 Switzerland's foreign policy had been grounded on one
unshakable rock: neutrality - which meant keeping out of other countries' wars,
expecting other countries to stay out of its affairs, and treating all other nations
theoretically evenly. When they joined the League of Nations in 1920, the Swiss
abandoned their centuries-old policy of absolute neutrality in favor of one of
"conditional neutrality", i.e. that under limited circumstances they would participate
in coercive, but non-military, measures to thwart a breaker of the League's
covenant. 120 But after the failure of the League, and seeing the road to war being
taken by the Powers, Switzerland renounced this policy when it decided in October
1938 to revert to absolute neutrality to relieve itself of any lingering legal obligation
to enforce sanctions. 121 In light of its renewed scrupulous neutrality, in the summer
of 1939 the Swiss government accordingly ceased any official public utterances
designed to influence the about-to-be belligerents from altering their policies.
Bern's fear was that any such course of action might be interpreted as taking sides
as Europe's states moved along an inevitable path to war. 122
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Berlin viewed this policy as a deliberate rebuff by the Swiss, Germany being
the racial and linguistic wellspring of over two thirds of Switzerland's people, as well
as its largest trading partner. 123 It should be understood, however, that this Swiss
posture of even-handedness came not from strong federal leadership, but was
born of a deep-seated hatred for Nazi methods and ideology, a hatred loudly
expressed by a substantial majority of the Swiss people in their unique and (in
1939) still almost personal democracy. The nation's journalists (particularly those
of the German-language press) and intellectuals, and, especially, the officer corps
of the Swiss army were the chief guarantors that Switzerland would not gravitate
toward National Socialism but instead continue to embrace the nation's "historic
II

values of independence, moderation and self-reliance.
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alone were not enough to solve the problems that the economy faced once
surrounded by a continent at war. With no sea coast of their own from which to
export or import materials, the Swiss were forced to depend on potentially hostile
neighbors for shipment facilities. 126
In the early stages of the war, before the German attack through the Low
Countries in May 1940, the Swiss were also concerned, justifiably and seriously,
about both sides dragging the Confederation into the war by outflanking the
fortifications on the Franco-German frontier 127 and invading each other through
Swiss territory, especially via the Belfort hinge in France. 128 All these factors
determined Switzerland's behavior at the outset of war, behavior that would prove
to be far from neutral or even-handed but which allowed the Swiss economy to
keep from either collapsing or reverting to a kind of agrarianism for which the
majority of the highly industrialized Swiss population would have been ill-prepared
to participate. 129
Before European hostilities broke out in September 1939, there was some
fear, particularly in American intellectual circles, that Switzerland, which had
seemingly overreacted to the Comintern threat at the time of the Spanish Civil War
by partially outlawing the Communist party, would come under Nazi influence by
permitting some kind of semi-Anschluss with Germany. 130 It was out of the Swiss
government's wish not to offend Berlin or Rome that these foreign fears emanated,
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and the government's efforts not to upset the Nazi colossus to its north was seen in
more sympathetic circles as understandable Realpolitik. Nonetheless, during the

war Switzerland continued to come under severe press criticism in the West for
what was perceived as unseemly licking of German boots. 131
In fact, the concerns in much of the West about the Swiss people's
psychological incapacity to withstand the German siren appear to have been
greatly exaggerated. The overwhelming majority of the Swiss rejected German
demands for either union or Nazification of its institutions, despite government
concessions to Germany regarding such matters as the importation of Nazi
propaganda material or even the larger issue of stopping criticism of Germany in
Switzerland's press. Heinz Meier wrote that in order to survive the ordeal of
1939/1945, Switzerland

hadto trade with Germany, had to black out its cities, made it difficult
for refugees to enter the country, 132 lived under a constant threat of
invasion, and had to submit to severe restrictions in the consumption
of food, manufactures of all kinds, and gasoline
in placating its "snarling enemies", yet the country "remained true to itself." 133
It is generally conceded today that had Germany wanted to occupy
Switzerland in World War II, it could have done so - but at a huge price. Wringing
that high price out of Germany was, as the Swiss government and people realized,
the factor most responsible for its independence and neutrality. Following World
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War I, Switzerland had, like most pacific-oriented states, largely ignored military
defense. But after Hitler came to power in 1933, the Federal Council, sensing the

new danger from its powerful neighbor, began to undertake a limited military buildup, albeit one engendering the criticism of Swiss socialists and the country's other
left-wing political groups. In 1936, more substantive re-arming began, with new
fortifications built on the northern and northeastern frontiers and in the strategic
Alpine chokepoints. Two years later, following the Munich crisis, all tunnels, roads
and bridges near the nation's borders were mined and put under permanent
guard, 134 the government understanding that scrupulous neutrality was tied to the
counterweight of an active and vigilant military back-up. 135
The cornerstone of Switzerland's security was its army. Swiss military
training was the most rigorous of any of the six European neutrals. Under the
universal military training provision of its constitution, every able-bodied male
without exception was called-up at 19 (lowered in 1939 from age 20), and was
required to give from two to six weeks of active duty training every year until the
age of forty; furthermore, all males were kept on the active reserve roles until
reaching sixty. 136 Four hundred thousand Swiss were called-up under the first
general mobilization of September 1939, and by May 1940, a total of 850,000 were
engaged at least part-time in the country's defense, including women's auxiliaries
and home guards. During the period from 1939 to 1945, there were never less
than 100,000 men under arms at any given time. 137
134 Toynbee,
135

The War & the Neutrals, 202.

Ibid, 210.

136

The normal peacetime army numbered about 50,000 men, including
reservists. 1933 World Almanac of the "New York World Telegram."
137

157.

Georg Thueren, Free & Swiss - The Story of Switzerland, London, 1970,

55
The theory underlying Switzerland's mobilization plans in September 1939
called for the border to be guarded by active military; if a general mobilization order
went out, the entire military force could be brought into an active defense posture
within 24 hours. Half a million troops were assigned to the Alpine regions; these
represented the armed elite, the body whose military skills and general
preparedness were meant to give pause to any aggressor, even the Wehrmacht
Backing these troops were strongly-fortified borders and strategic sites: the area
around the Swiss entrance to the St-Gotthard tunnel was in 1939 held to be the
most heavily fortified place in the world, exceeding even the fortifications at the
ends of the Panama Canal. 138 Though Germany very much coveted Switzerland's
assets, the factor which kept the merits of an invasion from outweighing its costs
was Germany's certain knowledge that the Swiss military would prove a tenacious
enemy to defeat, and that the Swiss would unhesitatingly institute a kind of
"scorched earth" defense by destroying their most valuable assets - the tunnels
linking Germany to Italy.
On August 22, 1939, an unsigned memorandum was prepared by State
Minister Otto Koecher in Berlin that "would serve as guidance on language to be
held for German Missions abroad." With reference to Switzerland, the
memorandum stated "the intention to respect Swiss neutrality should be reiterated
to the Swiss Government and reference made to the repeated unequivocal
statements by the Fuehrer on this question. "139 Nine days layer, on September 1,
the day Germany attacked Poland, the following memorandum by the State
Secretary was filed with the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:
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I pointed out. ..that the German attitude toward Switzerland has been
clearly defined to the Federal Counsellor a few days previously by
Minister Koecher .... I noted with gratitude that...the Swiss

Government declared their readiness to lend every assistance to
furthering humanitarian work. [signed Weizsaecker] 140
But professed German respect for Swiss neutrality quickly began to take the
form of demands that Switzerland voluntarily circumscribe much of its own freedom
of action as a sovereign state. After the outbreak of hostilities, one of the points of
contention between the Reich and Switzerland involved Germany's furor over the
still relatively uncensored Swiss press. 141 Berlin was affronted by the anti-Nazi tone
of many of the Swiss papers, which finally caused Weizsaecker to threaten
Switzerland's president, Henri Vallotton, with retaliation unless the situation were
rectified. In a memorandum of February 12, 1940 from Weizsaecker to the Foreign
Ministry in Berlin, he reported that he "impressed upon [Vallotton] how necessary it
was for the Swiss press to adopt a different attitude that that heretofore taken." 142
This would be followed by many more German demands that Switzerland
recognize the futility of clinging to Europe's old order.
When the Wehrmachtattacked the Low Countries in May 1940, the Swiss
government's most immediate concern was that its own territory would be
simultaneously violated by a German drive through Switzerland. In consequence,
on May 1O, the day after the German drive in the West began, the Swiss ordered a
general mobilization of their army, bringing it to a high state of readiness if it should
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have to defend the country's borders. Invasion fears peaked on the night of May
14-15, when, because of German troop concentrations in the Black Forest, an

invasion at the northern end of the country, through the Basel area, was held to be
imminent. For the only time during World War II, a widespread civilian exodus
ensued from towns in line of the expected invading Germans to the safer southern
cantons and the Bernese Oberland. 143
In the face of such an overwhelming threat from Germany, the Swiss
government, though responding with military mobilization, adopted a political
attitude that seemed defeatist to many Swiss. Throughout the war, the Federal
Council wielded powers greatly exceeding those granted it by the country's
constitution, and even though elections were held in 1939 and in 1943, 144 the role
of the parliament was correspondingly extremely circumscribed. For example, the
right of referendum was suspended except where the Federal Council specifically
permitted it, and the nation's civilian security and police agencies were
subordinated to the military, although martial law as such was never declared. 145
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Marcel Pilet-Golaz, the federal counsellor who was president in 1940, 146
made a broadcast to the nation on June 25, 1940. France, had fallen a few days
earlier, which meant that Switzerland was now effectively encircled by Axisoccupied or Axis-controlled territory, making its situation ominous. In his address,
Pilet seemed to castigate his fellow Swiss for their "relapse into the past" - in
apparent reference to the country's resistance to what he believed was clearly
going to be Europe's "New Order" -and for their "indolent, comfortable and snug
mode of life which would now have to come to an end. "147 Using Nazi jargon, he
called for Erneuerung (renewal) and Anpassung (adaptation) of Swiss institutions
and policies. 148 The effect of the broadcast on the Swiss people was one of
general amazement, particularly on those army commanders using the breather of
the so-called Phony War - the period after the end of the Polish conflict and before
the onset of the German attack in the West - to strengthen the country's defenses
against the expected German attack.
When Pilet ordered the army to be reduced by two-thirds in a last-minute
attempt to propitiate the Germans, many Swiss took the view that the president
was condemning their way of life, and in doing so had become a near-collaborator
by easing the way for a German takeover. Though his role as a high official of a
small country trying to chart its way through every conceivable kind of foreign
threat would have brought criticism to Pilet in any case, the Swiss thereafter
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regarded the president (who would continue as a federal counsellor and foreign
minister until 1944) as the country's leading symbol of appeasement.
But major Western newspapers and magazines also assumed that
Switzerland would in the end have to succumb to Hitler's often-stated
determination to force all ethnic Germans to return to the Reich, including
presumably, the three million German-speaking Swiss. Time magazine had written
in 1938 what was then commonly thought that because the German-speaking
Swiss were "Germans", they must be considered "racial comrades of the Fuehrer"
and thus subject to the inevitability of "Hitler ... gobbling up the nation whole."149
But there was a very different reaction in Switzerland to the German threat,
one embodied by Henri Guisan, the major Swiss hero to come out of the Second
World War. He was a French-speaking gentleman-farmer and head of the
confederation's armed forces who in the summer of 1940 became the "center and
personification of resistance" 150 to his countrymen. Exactly one month after Pilet's
broadcast, Guisan took an action that shaped Switzerland's actions for the
remainder of the war, and one which immediately drew from Germany a yelp of
surprised indignation. Protected by a battalion of mountain infantry, Guisan
convoked an unprecedented meeting with 650 of his officers at the Ruetli meadow
on the Lake of Lucerne, the historic birthplace in 1291 of the Swiss Confederation.
To combat what he saw as an "accommodation" to German demands that might
lead to capitulation to Berlin's insistence that Switzerland merge its economy with
the Reich's, 151 Guisan elicited from his officers a pledge to "unconditional
resistance" should any invader threaten the nation's freedom. The general detailed
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the defense policy he had worked out, one utilizing and strengthening
Switzerland's natural barriers, particularly its formidable mountains. 152
Guisan and his staff officers drew the nation's system of defenses in as
flexible a pattern as possible. The actual frontiers were set with elasticized forwarddefense measures to take up the brunt of an invasion while giving the main Swiss
forces time to fall back into second and third lines of defense based on
mountainous terrain studded with heavily fortified positions. 153 The nucleus of
Switzerland's military forces would retreat into this Alpine "redoubt", one virtually
unreachable by any invading army and from which sanctuary they could continue
to harass their pursuers indefinitely. Guisan also had as a plus the knowledge that
Berlin knew it couldn't take Switzerland unaware, as it had done with, for example,
Norway or the Netherlands. The Swiss military command expected a German
invasion, and was fully prepared to thwart it. 154
The single weak link in Switzerland's chain of natural defenses was the
relatively flat plateau stretching from the southwest at Lake Geneva to the northeast
at Lake Constance. But Guisan fortified this most exposed part of Switzerland's
countryside with both a forward line behind Basel and a deeper one several
kilometers behind this frontier area. Together they were designed to constitute a
holding action while the bulk of the armed forces retreated to their ultimate position,
the great central Alpine expanse in the center-south focused on the St-Gotthard
tunnel. 155
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In this massively-fortified redoubt, which would in later years become
virtually a Swiss legend, 156 the national identity was meant to be preserved, as
were, more concretely, the two supremely important Alpine tunnels, the St.Gotthard and the Simplon. According to Fortune, a fortress-city had been built in
the redoubt, one supplied with power plants, dormitories, stores for all kinds of
necessities stocked with amounts calculated to last the defenders three years,
hospitals, and "even a gymnasium", presumably in which the defending soldiers
and managing bureaucrats would keep themselves fit. 157 Guisan calculated his
army would be capable of holding out here indefinitely, but if the redoubt were
seriously threatened, his trump card remained the destruction of the tunnels
themselves, an action that would leave Italy linked to Germany by only a single
connection, the Austrian Brenner Pass. Thus Guisan's strategy was that Germany
would have to pay an enormous price for whatever satisfaction it would gain by
incorporating Switzerland into the Reich. 158
The German yelp intensified when Berlin learned of Guisan's plan - much of
which was openly publicized and a plan that was already serving to raise public
morale. The German minister in Switzerland, Otto Koecher, wired the Foreign
Ministry in Berlin:
The Army Staff reveals through the local morning press that on July
25 General Guisan, on Mt. [sic] Ruetli, personally gave the order of
the day to his troop commanders down to battalion commanders. In
majority of the Swiss, evidently fed up with German threats, supported the
Commander-in-Chief. Fodor, Neutrals, 50.
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his order General Guisan states that Switzerland is at a turning point
in her history, that it is a matter of the preservation of Switzerland .... !
suggest considering whether joint or separate demarch~s of similar
content by the Axis Powers would not be in order, expressing our
surprise at renewed incitement of Swiss public opinion against
Germany and Italy; if anything could make the allied Axis Powers
vacillate in their resolve to maintain their previous attitude toward
Switzerland, it is such an inopportune demonstration as that of the
General. The German Government ought to remind Switzerland, in
this connection, of the steps by which it called the attention of the
Federal Council to the campaign against Germany and German
nationals residing here. It would have to hold the Swiss Government
responsible for any excesses which mi~ht arise from the official
statements of the Swiss Army leader. 15
Nonetheless Germany scrapped any idea of an immediate invasion as too costly.
Koecher's telegram occasioned no substantive demarch~ in either of the Axis
members' diplomatic policies in respect to Switzerland. 160
In surprising contrast to the usual American press denigration of Switzerland
in the late 1930s because of its seeming subservience to German demands
circumscribing its own freedom of actions, such carping began to ameliorate after
Guisan's actions. In an admiring article in the September 1941 issue of Fortune
magazine, 161 the measures the Swiss had undertaken since war's outbreak to build
up their defenses against a German attack were set out. The same article
editorially quashed the German "blood-to-blood" myth that had had many
-',

Americans believing the Swiss were somehow consigned by destiny to "return" to
the Reich. 162
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After the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, renewed
German pressure designed to soften up the Swiss for an eventual incorporation
into Europe's "New Order" was brought to bear. Among other demands, Berlin
insisted that Switzerland's traditionally free press report only positive stories
regarding the Axis states and, conversely, only negative stories regarding the
Allies, adding to the earlier insistence that only stories reflecting favorably on
Germany be printed; that Switzerland's banned German Nazi and Italian Fascist
parties be re-legalized; that all elements of the Swiss military demobilize; and that
every significant Swiss industry be immediately turned over to German "advisers"
who would control export policies. To most of these demands, Switzerland
responded unequivocally in the negative, with the exception of the Nazi strictures
on Switzerland's press freedom: the nation's papers were told to tone down antiGerman stories in the interests of assuaging Berlin, the Federal Council viewing
concession to this relatively minor imposition on Swiss sovereignty as reasonable
prudence. 163 A writer for the Basler Nachrichten had only recently created an
incident by impudently commenting that Germany's "Kreuzzug [crusade] in the
Soviet Union was at best a Hakenkreuzzug. "164
Because Switzerland's economy was to a large extent tied to German
sufferance as regarded imports of raw materials and exports of finished materials,
the reality was that the country had lost a very material part of its economic
sovereignty. Because Switzerland was surrounded by German, or Germancontrolled, or German-allied territory, the September 1, 1940 Nazi decree that
placed all Swiss exports under Axis control was an unavoidable reality for the
Swiss, one that was faced daily by the Swiss business community which had to
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secure German permits for nearly everything the country exported. The effect was
that trade with the Allies nearly stopped. For example, the 17% of the country's
exports that had gone to Britain before the war was cut to virtually nothing by
1940. 165 With some irony, those products that the Germans would have permitted
Switzerland to receive from Allied countries - primarily bulk foodstuffs - were denied
entry by the Allies themselves who withheld navicerts (for shipment into Genoa,
landlocked Switzerland's leased "homeport") for fear the products would be re-sold
to Germany. 166
The German blockade forced Switzerland in the first months of the war to
switch from civilian production intended for export to military production, goods
which were bought by all the belligerents and which brought back 1938 export
levels by the spring of 1940. With the fall of France in June of that year, exports
again dropped dramatically, but within 12 months the Axis partners and their allies
once again brought exports back to 1938 levels. Now that the blocs were no
longer able to bid against each other, Germany effectively set prices after June
1940, cutting Switzerland's profits and in some cases forcing the Swiss to sell
armaments below costs, 167 a policy defended by the government on the basis that
it kept Swiss factories in production, thus enabling the country to produce
weapons for its own defense, the Swiss army's sting depending in large part on the
quality of these locally-produced armaments. 168 After 1940, each battalion,
besides being fully armed with high-quality automatic rifles and machine guns, was
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further equipped with what was in in the early 1940s considered one of the world's
best anti-tank guns, the 47-millimeter. 169

Among the gravest wartime shortages Switzerland endured was gasoline,
the last dribble of free access being cut off in spring 1941 when the Germans took
over the Balkan oil fields. Of the 120,000 automobiles registered in the country in
August 1939, by the fall of 1941 only 15,000 were still being used. The military had
its own gasoline reserve, but was able to avoid drawing down on it by tapping the
gasoline accumulations the government had astutely set aside in September 1939.
Private motorists could use only their own private stocks, and only in rationed
amounts; car owners without reserves were forced to put their vehicles in
storage. 170
One of the lessons the nation learned from the First World War was that the
mobilization of so much of the nation's manpower could have a disastrous effect
on the nation's economy if measures weren't taken to ameliorate the
consequences. Hence, one difference between the two wars was that after 1940
called-up reservists were paid an amount comparable to their civilian salaries out of
a national compensation fund, a fund to which employers, employees, the cantons
and the federal government contributed. A result of this compensatory policy was
that the nation's economic difficulties were spread relatively evenly across the
population. 171
Switzerland's role vis-a-vis the United States in World War II was probably
the least important of any of the neutrals. As a "listening post", though, it was
valuable - but to both sides: in 1941, at least six spy networks operated out of
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Switzerland, including two British-sponsored, pro-Soviet rings. 172 As late as March
1943, the efficient Swiss military intelligence service reported to Bern that a German

invasion was imminent, one possibly meant to preempt an Allied incursion through
Switzerland Hitler wanted carried out as soon as the Wehrmacht was in a position
to seize Switzerland's Alpine redoubt. 173 Though the government assured the
Germans that the Swiss would defend their neutrality against a// invaders, the scare
was nonetheless real in the late winter and early spring of 1943. 174 In an
extraordinary meeting with Waffen-SS General Walter Schellenberg at Biglen, in
Swiss territory near Bern, Guisan warned the Nazi commander that he should have
no doubts whatsoever that the Swiss would put up ferocious resistance to thwart a
German attack, and that even at this late date in the war, when it was clear that
Germany had no chance to defeat its enemies, the Swiss army would still destroy
the three Alpine rail tunnels rather than let an invader have use of them. 175 In any
event, after the collapse of his Italian ally, Hitler buried for good any notions of
invading Switzerland, apparently reasoning that functioning Alpine tunnels, whose
use the Swiss still freely allowed German military forces in occupied northern Italy,
would best serve Germany's interests. 176
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The most important Allied official in Switzerland during the war was Allen
Dulles. Officially posted to Bern as assistant to the U.S. ambassador, Dulles' real
role was chief of American intelligence operations for occupied Europe, his primary
task to follow events inside the Third Reich itself. 177 Operating for the Office of
Strategic Services, Dulles made special efforts to find out who in Germany
opposed the Nazi regime, and whether such persons would actively cooperate
with the Allies in an attempt to overthrow it. In carrying out his operations, Dulles
received the close cooperation of the Swiss intelligence services. He was not,
however, much surprised when he learned that the Swiss were providing exactly
the same assistance to the German intelligence services - a situation Dulles judged
beneficial to the Allied cause since it gave him broader and more accurate
information than would otherwise have been possible. 178
An area in which Swiss interests came up against those of the United States
concerned Switzerland's airspace. Both U.S. and British military aircraft regularly
overflew Switzerland on their wide-ranging bombing operations, particularly
missions over Italian targets. The 300 Swiss air force pilots were under order to
ignore what appeared to them to be accidental, single-craft incursions, but if entire
formations were spotted the pilots were either to force them to land, or, if
necessary, to shoot them down - irrespective of the origin of the aircraft involved.
In April 1944 alone, 650 incursions were reported, most of them by then Allied. At
war's end, some 150 American B-17s and B-24s were interned at Swiss air bases their crews the relatively pampered guests of the Swiss state. 179
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An especially unsettling incident for Swiss-American relations involved the
accidental bombing of Schaffhausen, Switzerland's only major town on the

northern, German side of the Rhine. The town had been mistaken by the American
bombing crews for the German city of Tuttlingen, 21 miles from Schaffhausen. The
1944 raid left 150 casualties and 50 buildings destroyed, for which in 1949 the
United States paid Switzerland $62 million in compensation, a figure set by the
Swiss during the war and which included interest from the day of the raid. 180
There was an additional function filled by Switzerland during the war, one
which was of great value to the Allies in respect of the importance of which
American and British policy judged it wiser not to push the Swiss into difficult
choices. The country served as the protecting power for Allied interests in
Germany and in Japan. Most important in this regard was the role fulfilled by Swiss
officials of inspecting enemy prisoner-of-war camps, reporting on the treatment of
Allied internees and having the ability - most important late in the war - of
uncovering and protesting, albeit on a limited basis, the frightening conditions they
found. The Swiss also arranged prisoner-of-war exchanges between Allies and
Axis, with the International Red Cross, headquartered in Geneva, serving as the
clearance center for messages between prisoners and their families. 181
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SWEDEN
"Every attack against the freedom
and independence of the realm
will be met with force .... Sweden
can and will defend itself."
Civil Defense pamphlet 182
Sweden was, with Switzerland, one of only two legally- and traditionally
recognized neutral states in Europe. Its position of neutrality from the outbreak of
war was in large part a result of its disappointments in the utility of the League of
Nations and the growing realization that it could rely only on itself. In
consequence, Swedish foreign policy took on an increasingly isolationist bent in
the six years between Hitler's installation as chancellor and the start of the
European war. 183 In the 1930s Sweden was the single Scandinavian state to have
a military force of any real substance, 184 and was therefore compelled in the years
just prior to the outbreak of World War II to play the central part in Scandinavia's
relations with both belligerent blocs. The Scandinavian bloc policy that Sweden
formulated in those years was designed to keep the North aloof from Europe's
power plays, but the region was nevertheless brought into war in 1939 with the
Russian attack on Finland, the latter becoming in 1940 a German ally; later that
year, Norway and Denmark were invaded and occupied by the Germans, leaving
Sweden on its own and surrounded by the Axis, its allies or its captives. 185
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Sweden's successful neutrality in the Second World War was the result of
three primary factors: its geographical position, its military preparedness and
willingness of its government and citizens to fight if invaded, and - perhaps most
importantly - its acquiescence to Germany's demands that it maintain at prewar
levels shipments of essential military supplies to the Reich. This last factor included
the high-grade iron ore vitally necessary to Germany's armaments factories: for the
Germans to have converted steel production to their own low-grade ore would
have placed a considerable, some say intolerable, burden on its war economy. 186
Sweden underwent a critical test of its neutrality policies with the RussoFinnish winter war of 1939-40. The Soviet attack on Finland on November 30, 1939
caused a public outcry among Swedes, a people with closer ties to Finland than
any other Scandinavian state. Though many Swedes demanded active
intervention on Finland's side, the Danish and Norwegian governments urged
Sweden to realize that such intervention would inevitably involve all the powers in a
general Scandinavian theater of war. In fact, Sweden's government did
understand the danger to its status as a neutral by becoming too involved in the
Finnish war, even its surreptitious and relatively minor military and humanitarian aid
to its neighbor. Historian Ake Thulstrup characterized the new attitude of the
Swedish government as essentially a negative one though:
There arose early on an unhealthy ideology of neutrality, remote from
reality, which put forward such ideas as that the war in actual fact was
no concern of ours and that the neutrals were morally far superior to
the Powers who were involved in the war .187
Nonetheless, Sweden continued to quietly help Finland to the extent
possible by terming its assistance "non-belligerent interventionism", even though
186 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 97. Toynbee says in such a scenario
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considerable quantities of materiel were involved and the recruitment of about 9000
Swedish volunteers to help the Finns was permitted. Sweden realized, however,
that eventually Finland would be forced to bow to the massive Russian superiority
in numbers (if not in quality) of troops, and refused to jeopardize its own neutrality
any further by acquiescing to Allied requests to allow troops to cross Sweden to
come to Finland's assistance. 188 During most of this first Russo-Finnish war,
Sweden's actions vis a vis Finland have been compared to American participation
in 1940 and 1941 in the European war, when the United States was most active in
supporting the British cause. 189
As to its western flank, Sweden had made limited joint military preparations
with Norway before April 1940, including joint military planning conferences. But in
1939 Swedish defense strategists neither anticipated nor planned for a western
war. When Germany invaded Norway, necessitating a defense of the entire
Swedish-Norwegian border, Sweden was utterly unprepared for such an
undertaking. 190
On April 12, 1940, three days after the German invasion of neighboring
Denmark and Norway, Swedish prime minister Per Albin Hansson went on the
radio to outline his country's policy in regard to its warring neighbors:
Sweden is firmly determined to continue to follow the line of strict
neutrality. That implies that we must reserve for ourselves
independence of judgment and independence of action in every
direction. It is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any
belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity.
Fortunately no demands in such a direction have been made of us.
Should any such demands be made they must be refused. 191
lS8 Henning Friis, Scandinavia Between East and West, Ithaca, 1950, 278279. Some U.S. and French war materiel was allowed through.
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From the very beginning of the war, official Swedish actions involved
expanding the country's defense capabilities to ensure that Hansson's words
could be supported. Speaking from the throne on September 9, 1939, King
Gustav V expressed his government's determination to stay out of the conflict, and,
to back up this determination, to greatly expand the country's armaments and
defense expenditures. 192 For the remainder of the war, this military preparedness,
tempered with the pragmatism to bend to bearable demands on its sovereignty,
would be the policy Sweden would successfully follow.
The reasons for Germany's failure to invade Sweden when Denmark and
Norway were occupied have never been made completely clear. But it is known
today that a German invasion of Sweden, while unquestionably within the Reich's
military capabilities in 1940, would have upset Germany's carefully worked-out
timetable had such an attempt been meaningfully contested - which Berlin fully
believed it would be. The Norwegian and Danish occupations (the former meant
specifically to counter a British occupation of northern Norway's coast) were to be
followed within weeks by the attack in the West, and the Germans, accurately
assessing the strength and resolve of the Swedish nation and its military defenses,
must have reasoned that they could get what they wanted from Sweden by means
far less burdensome than a military invasion and occupation. Berlin further knew
that after the Weseruebung moves on its Scandinavian neighbors it could no
longer surprise Sweden. Though Sweden's terrain is admittedly less formidable
than that of Switzerland, the forested, lake-filled northern parts of the country,
almost bereft of communication lines, would also have presented the Wehrmacht
with a very difficult undertaking. Finally, the coveted and rich Kiruna iron ore
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deposits lay in the north, allowing the Swedes plenty of time to fulfill their promise to
destroy them in case of a German invasion. 193
An additional, less measurable but still important factor was the attitude of
Stalin, who - allied with Hitler at the time - let it be known that he would regard
unfavorably an invasion of Sweden by Germany. The Soviet dictator evidently
reasoned that Sweden was in the Soviet sphere of influence, thus presenting a
constraint on German movements in the North that Berlin couldn't at the time
entirely disregard. 194
In 1940, the United States publicly announced that it considered Sweden's
neutrality policy to be the realistic course for the country to take, 195 the State
Department noting with approval Sweden's avowed intention to defend its territorial
integrity against any invading force. 196 The United States further supported a
nebulous plan for a Finno-Swedish union, designed to take Finland out of the war
but which the Soviet Union resisted, as did the Germans. 197 All in all, American
policy looked more at the substance of Sweden's actions than at its necessary
concessions to overwhelming German economic pressure. 198
The most sensitive problem affecting relations between Sweden and both
belligerent blocs was the famous issue involving transshipment of German soldiers
and war materiel across Swedish territory to re-garrison and re-supply the
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Wehrmachtin Norway. 199 There were many breaches in Sweden's neutrality, but
none would be so controversial, not to say odious, in Sweden itself or among the
members of the anti-Nazi alliance.
After the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, Germany
demanded that Sweden allow the Wehrmachttransit facilities across Swedish
territory so it could keep its northern Norwegian garrison centered on Narvik
supplied. The undertaking would have been too costly - if not impossible - for the
Germans to have carried out entirely by sea: though their control of the Skagerrak
guaranteed them relatively safe access to southern Norway, getting to Narvik
meant broaching the superior British naval forces in the North Sea. 200 In response
to these German demands for the use of its railroads, on April 12 the Swedish
prime minister announced: "Sweden is firmly determined to continue to follow the
line of strict neutrality ... lt is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any
belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity." 201 But Sweden, which
had been expecting the demands, 202 concluded by late April that it had no realistic
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alternative but to partially accede to Germany's demands. It did stipulate, however,
that shipments must be strictly limited to medical supplies until afterthe fall of

Norway, when Stockholm would at least be able to justify its actions by rationalizing
that nothing more could be done to help Norway in its fight against the Nazis. 203
At first, a subterfuge was employed which seemed, in the narrowest
technical sense, to get around the matter of violating Sweden's neutrality: Sweden
would allow "Red Cross" trains, operating as regular commercial freight carriers, to
transit its territory carrying "non-military" goods - food, clothing, gasoline, etc. - for
the Narvik garrison. The German "medical personnel" on the trains were in reality
critically needed military specialists, and the "non-military" goods were in fact lethal.
As the price for this acquiescence, the Swedes demanded from the Reich
substantial arms shipments for its own defense build-up, a price which Berlin
met. 204
But the issue was far from permanently settled. Now the Germans began to
demand the transit of undisguised and unlimited war materiel - which the Swedes
refused. At first promises of reward were held out, but increasingly there were
threats to restrict Sweden's allowable imports through the German-controlled
shipping lanes. Before April 9 Germany had predictably demanded that Sweden
remain strictly neutral. But after the Norwegian and Danish occupations and
Sweden's removal from the possibility of help from the west, Germany205 insisted

~Henrik S. Nissen ed, Scandinavia During the Second World War,
Minneapolis, 1983, 105.
204
205

DGFP, v. IX, 245-246.

The threats often came from Hermann Goering himself, who because of
his Swedish connections personally involved himself in these negotiations.
Goering's first wife, Carin van Kantzow, nee Fack, was the member of an
aristocratic Swedish family. Leonard Mosley, The Reich Marshal, Garden City,
1974, 59.

76
that Sweden effectively relinquish its neutrality in what to the Reich had become the
critically important matter of protecting its far-northern Atlantic flank. All through
this, the Narvik commander, General Edouard Dietl, continued to urgently request
more men and materiel to ward off the expected Allied landing, Dietl's pleas
meaning ever-nastier demands that Sweden drop all restrictions on the use of its
railroads.
Even the proffered promise of additional war materiel to bolster its own
defense needs didn't budge the Swedes from their negative position. On April 27,
the German minister in Stockholm, Prince Victor zu Wied, reported to the Foreign
Ministry in Berlin that "an expeditious way to take up the question of transit to
Narvik ... without danger of an official rejection ... is receiving those deliveries of arms
to which we have already committed ourselves", 206 but three days later he had to
report to Berlin that "the impression of our negotiators is that offers of further
German deliveries of arms are not regarded by the Swedish Government as
compensation for [further] modification of its neutrality policy", 207 and that "the
German suggestion that transit of arms and ammunition to German troops in
Norway be permitted in conjunction with the German supplies of arms to Sweden
was rejected in these discussions. "208
German policy now moved to undisguised force meant to budge Stockholm
from its obstinacy. First came an embargo on any more arms, arms which Sweden
needed to protect itself from the source from which they came. Concessions on
overseas Swedish shipping - shipping controlled, of course, by Germany209 - were
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canceled. While Dietl was expecting a British attack on Narvik at any moment, and
wiring to Berlin his urgent pleas for artillery (he estimated he would be able to hold
out against an Allied assault for only ten to fourteen days without it), Sweden
remained firm in its refusal to permit the shipments to be expanded to meet
Germany's demands. Neither, though, did Britain make its move, which resulted in
giving Germany additional time to pressure Sweden for the transit rights.
. Finally, Goering offered Sweden two options by which he held the
"formalistic" Swedish objections could be successfully overcome. 210 Either
continue to send the military materiel in sealed railroad cars across Sweden,
marked with the Red Cross symbol, or else allow the Swedes to appear to the
Allies to have been duped by having the Germans seem to sneak it through by
delivering it to a northern Swedish port as having been meant for Sweden. 211 After
Goering openly blustered that the best way to change Swedish opinion would be a
few bombing attacks, the Swedes responded by redeploying their armies, now at
the highest state of combat preparedness, to the sites most likely to receive a
German invasion. On May 13, the Swedish military command ordered mobilization
preparatory to state of war with Germany.

but goods bound for Allied countries were strictly banned. Both blocs closely
checked this Swedish shipping (most of which was bound for Argentina): Germans
to make sure no Swedish goods were bound for Britain or the U.S., the Allies to
make sure no goods for Germany were sent on the return leg. Small amounts of
material bound for Britain could get out through Petsamo, in Finland, but this
represented a trickle of the 70% of Swedish exports that had been sent to the West
before the war. Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 62, 75.
210
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Ribbentrop now took over the negotiations. Summoning Arvid Richert, the
Swedish minister in Berlin, he lectured the diplomat on the "factors of Realpolitik',
that it was in Sweden's interests to allow the transit rights, by now specifically
quantified to three trains, each with 30 to 40 sealed cars containing mostly artillery
and anti-aircraft guns, with ammunition, so the British and French could be
removed from Norway and thus would not represent a threat to Sweden. State
Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker added that although "Narvik was of no
significance to the outcome of the war", nonetheless
in spite of this it would, judging from my experience, affect the
Fuehrer with his soldierly nature most unfavorably if the Swedish
Government, unduly exaggerating its neutral feeling, did not fulfill the
wishes .... Such an attitude on the part of the Swedish Government
would be the more incomprehensible since the interests of Sweden
and Germany were identical in this question. 212
Still the Swedish cabinet refused to accede to the German demands.
Though Minister Richert urged the government to give in, it would not. Only the
Commander-in-Chief of the army advised capitulation to avoid war with Germany,
adding that in its present state of military strength the country had no hope of
holding out against Germany for any length of time. Ironically, a Swedish
agreement at this time - late May - might have led to Sweden being dragged into
the war anyway, through an attack by the British, who coveted the prospect of
cutting off Germany's iron ore supply from Sweden and who are known to have
planned bombing raids on the ore shipments had Sweden acquiesced to the
expanded transit demands at this juncture. 213
What continued to be the basis for the Swedish government's extremely
dangerous thwarting of Germany's demands was its honor in the Nordic
212 West, Transit Agreement, 82.
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community, honor which it felt would be forfeit if it allowed Swedish territory to be
used to harm its fellow Scandinavian state. The text of Richart's explanation to the

German government for his own government's actions gave his view:
In the eyes of the Swedes, it would ... be an almost dishonorable
action. It would call forth the greatest indignation and would burden
the government with a sense of shame which it, in view of the Nordic
sense of community, would be able neither to shake off nor to
bear. 214
The wrangling on the question was tempered in the last critical days before
the Narvik campaign began by a Swedish offer to serve as a neutral protector and
administrator of the Narvik area if all belligerents would abandon the area. The
plan had little support from any quarter, but it did have some utility for the feint it
provided at the height of the crisis. Finally, on May 28, the combined British,
French, Polish and Norwegian assault on Narvik began, with Dietl immediately
being pushed back into the coastal mountains along the Swedish border. For
Sweden, though, the situation was resolved when the Allies were forced to
withdraw their troops to stave off an expected invasion of Britain itself. While this
took the immediate pressure off Sweden, it also meant that the Allies were now
totally withdrawn from Scandinavia and Sweden no longer able to position herself
diplomatically between two blocs: the country was now completely under the
military and physical dominance of Germany, and was "thus more than ever
dependent on Germany's goodwill."215
Not only was Sweden wedged ever firmer in Germany's orbit with the Allied
withdrawal, but it now also lost its primary reason - its stand of honor - for refusing
German transit. With the collapse of Norwegian resistance on June 1o, Germany
realized, too, that Sweden would now have far less firm ground on which to
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continue its refusal. 216 And because Germany still wanted the Narvik area heavily
fortified to protect its naval and military positions in the North Sea area, it continued
pressure on Sweden to acquiesce. With its huge victories in the West - France
having just been defeated - Germany's position seemed stronger than ever, and
Sweden fewer options in resisting German demands. The last straw was a
telegram received from Sweden's minister in Britain, Bjoern Prytz, who cabled that
the British government would now accept a "reasonable" peace offer, and Halifax
would replace Churchill as prime minister, if necessary, to accommodate these
ends. 217
Thus, with Britain very possibly out of the picture, with Germany controlling
Sweden's commercial links with the world, and with only diehard anti-Nazi
optimists believing anything less than a complete German military victory was in the
offing, Sweden decided it could no longer risk destruction and occupation. At a
cabinet meeting on June 18, 1940, a unanimous decision was taken to accede to
German demands. Neutrality "should not be maintained as an abstract idea, but
rather as a practical policy aimed at keeping us out of war", wrote one observer.
An acceptance of the German demand did not have to imply that we
abandoned our policy of neutrality. In this difficult situation I had
sought consolation in an image: a dead tree stands in the storm with
rigid branches, which break, but a living tree [bends]. 218
Sweden would henceforth permit transit facilities more than adequate for the
Wehrmachtto keep Narvik garrisoned.
For three years, Sweden was forced to give way to German military traffic
across its territory. Transports increased in size during the early months, from one
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a week at first, until finally the German demand for one train a day was agreed to.
What one Swedish diplomat characterized as "the price Sweden paid for its peace"
was summed up by a German diplomat visiting Stockholm a few months after the
agreement was reached:
...we expected not a rigid, but rather a living, constantly developing
neutrality which realistically takes account of the changes in the
military and political situation in Europe - in other words not an
inflexible neutrali~ 'toward all sides' when ... today 'all sides' no longer
exist for Sweden. 19
Sweden continued to be beholden to other German demands, including the
standard Nazi pressure applied more or less successfully to all neutrals to slant
their press policy in favor of the Reich and against the Allies. In June 1941 , Minister
Wied wired Berlin that the German effort "to reorient the Swedish press in our favor
has apparently been successful. "220
But the transit problem was the issue that continued to plague Sweden. A
contretemps arose in June 1941 when Germany demanded that the Oslo Division
(the 163rd Infantry Division) be allowed to cross Sweden, at which the cabinet
finally balked. King Gustav is reported to have threatened abdication if his
ministers didn't accede, which they finally did on June 25. Minister Wied wired the
Foreign Ministry in Berlin of his meeting with the monarch that day:
He [Gustav] has gone far in giving his personal support to the matter.
He added confidentially that in doing so he had found it necessary to
go even so far as to mention his abdication. 221 The King then
expressed the hope that Germany would make no demands on
Sweden going beyond these limits. 222
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But then Germany demanded transit in the opposite direction, meaning that
15,200 Norwegian-based troops should be allowed to traverse Sweden to
replenish German forces in Finland. Although another Swedish cabinet crisis
nearly ensued over this last outrage, Hansson gave in on a "one-time"
concession, 223 not on the basis of helping Germany but rather of actively taking
Finland's side in its own struggle. 224 What it demanded of Germany in return was
airplane engines, Messerschmitt 11 Os, French Twin Wasps, Daimler-Benz tanks,
half-ton half-tracks from Demag, 21-cm. Skoda cannon together with their
ammunition and equipment, and a long list of optical and radio equipment. Wied
approved the "order" in gratitude for Sweden's transit cooperation. 225
There is some speculation that Germany planned to attack Sweden in
August or September of 1941 to forestall any more Swedish equivocation, but the
German foreign office and military records do not verify such accounts. In any
event, it should be remembered that Sweden was still more important to Germany
as an economic partner than as a conquered vassal, a realization that underlay
Germany's actions toward Sweden throughout the war. 226
A legacy of the transit resolution was, of course, the bitterness it
engendered in Norway. The Norwegian government-in-exile in London vehemently
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protested the concessions, refusing to concede the Swedish position that the war
between Norway and Germany was over. Britain protested just as strongly, but in
reality neither Norway nor the United Kingdom had any desire to see Sweden be
dragged into the war. When Sweden instituted an unneutral act in the Allies' favorthe leasing of the half of Sweden's fleet that had been cut off in Allied ports in April
1940 - both Britain and the Norwegians were somewhat mollified. 227
Sweden's next invasion scare came in early 1942. After the American entry
into the war, Hitler expected a joint Anglo-American attack on Norway, with
Sweden joining the Allied cause, a scenario which led him to consider ordering a
German preemptive occupation of Sweden. So alarmed was the Swedish
government on learning of these plans from Richert that an emergency session of
the cabinet was immediately convened to decide how best to react. King Gustav
provided the German ambassador with solemn assurances that Sweden would
totally resist any Allied incursions on Swedish territory, assurances which Hitler
seems to have respected. In all likelihood however, the increased Swedish military
preparedness that had gone hand in hand with the king's message probably
influenced Hitler as much as the monarch's pledge. 228
There is evidence that in their negative decision for this 1942 invasion, the
Germans also took into account the formidable obstacles Sweden's western terrain
would have presented the Wehrmacht Swedish preparedness and the size and
quality of its increased armed forces were a major factor, but the Germans' reputed
plan to drive for the iron ore fields was probably dampened equally by the fact that
only two divisions were available for the task - troops were needed far more badly
for Russia and North Africa than for Scandinavia. Also, the Norwegian garrison's
227 Friis, Scandinavia, 284.
228

Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, 129.

84
relative inexperience was a factor in the Germans dropping serious planning for a
Swedish invasion at this point in the war. 229 The Swedish military response to this
threat, drawn up as war plans "Shield" and "Sword", was to use border guards and
home defense units to absorb the initial blow, a delaying action designed to allow
Sweden's first-line troops to come fully into play. The Swedish general staff
calculated 350,000 of its own troops, supported by 380 Swedish air force planes,
would come up against 280,000 German troops. 230
After December 1941, Washington's earlier understanding position
regarding Sweden's dilemma had begun to change. In 1942, the British started to
pressure the Swedes to reduce German troop trains to Narvik, as well as to cut iron
ore and ball bearing exports to Germany. 231 In the wake of these demands, the
Americans pushed even harder - indirectly threatening Sweden by withholding
Swedish food and fuel imports through the navicert system. Stockholm promptly
responded that Swedish foreign policy did not meet with "proper understanding
from London or Washington." 232 But American pressure on Sweden, especially in
respect to ball bearing shipments to Germany, increased significantly in early 1944,
when U.S. military planners became insistent that Germans not be able to replenish
their supplies after the planned forthcoming invasion. 233 Through the efforts of Erik
Boheman, Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, who went to
Washington in 1942 to argue his country's case, Sweden managed to convince
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Washington that its actions were justified to preclude a German invasion. 234 Oil
shipments to Sweden, totally embargoed for a short period, were subsequently

resumed via the neutral Swedish shipping which the Germans allowed into the
Baltic. 235
Throughout the war, it was the avowed American foreign policy to act tough
with the neutrals - a toughness usually missing from the more leniently-disposed
British Foreign Office (except where Ireland was concerned). 236 The United States
declared that its primary interest in Sweden sprang from the serious breach it
unquestionably represented in its strategic blockade of Nazi Europe. Fortunately
for the Swedes, their country was never critically important to either side - at least
not critical enough to invade or bomb. For Germany, so long as Sweden fulfilled its
trade obligations (or what Germany thought of as "obligations"), there was never an
overriding reason to invade it. Sweden found out that respect for the principles of
neutrality was far less important to the Allies than were their own interests - a
maxim it found itself obliged to carry out in counterpoint. 237
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By 1943 it became apparent to the Swedes, as it did to the other neutrals,
that Germany could no longer win the war, even though the Reich was still capable
of inflicting a heavy penalty on states that thwarted it. At the end of July, Sweden
notified Germany that the transit traffic had to stop in the following months, at the
same time mobilizing its own reserve troops to counter possible German reprisals
in retaliation for the new policy. On August 5, 1943, transit traffic was halted and
Swedish exports to Germany- primarily iron ore -were reduced. 238
The Swedish general staff drew up plans to liberate Norway and Denmark
late in the war (the plans for the Norwegian operation were more complete), but
were not implemented, in part because of recognition that Swedish troops still
wouldn't have arms superiority over the still-relatively fresh Wehrmachtelements in
Norway and Denmark. 239 It might furthermore be noted that Sweden was probably
influenced by the notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the British to assist
Norway to free itself at the war's end. 240
The services that Sweden was able to provide as a neutral to its
Scandinavian neighbors - Denmark, Norway and Finland - far outweighed what it
had cost them by its giving way to German demands on transit and materials. By
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the end of the war, 43,000 Norwegians had found refuge in Sweden, as had 18,000
Danes - including very nearly all of Denmark's Jewish citizens. Sweden actively
and often interceded with Germany for the release of Scandinavian inmates in
German concentration camps and prisons, traded wounded German soldiers from
Finland, and sent supplies for all such persons through its own humanitarian relief
services. Count Falke Bernadotte, a cousin of the king, personally arranged for the
release from German concentration camps of 15,000 prisoners, including not only
Danes and Norwegians, but also French, Polish, Dutch, Czech, British, American
and even Argentine prisoners. None of this would have been possible had Sweden
been occupied by the Germans. 241
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IRELAND
"Who are we neutral against?"
Anonymous 242
On August 29, 1939 -two days before Germany's attack on Poland Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed the German minister resident
in Dublin, Edouard Hempel, to clearly appraise the Irish government of Germany's
offer of normal relations so long as Ireland remained neutral in the coming war.
In accordance with the friendly relations between ourselves and
Ireland we are determined to refrain from any hostile action against
Irish territory and to respect her integrity, provided that Ireland, for
her part, maintains unimpeachable neutrality towards us in any
conflict. Only if this condition should no longer obtain as a result of a
decision of the Irish Government themselves, or by pressure exerted
on Ireland from other quarters, should we be compelled as a matter
of course, as far as Ireland was concerned too, to safeguard our
interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the situation then
arising might demand of us. 243
Two days later, Hempel wired back to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:
I carried out my instructions ... De Valera repeated the statement that
the Government's aim was to remain neutral. The final decision
would have to be taken by the Irish Parliament in due course ... He
said that in spite of the Irish Government's sincere desire to observe
neutrality equally towards both belligerents, Ireland's dependence on
Britain for trade vital to Ireland on one hand, and on the other the
possibility of intervention by Britain if the independence of Ireland
involved an immediate danger for Great Britain, rendered it inevitable
for the Irish Government to show a certain consideration for Britain,
which in similar circumstances they would also show for
Germany .... My general impression was one of a sincere effort to
keep Ireland out of the conflict, but of great fear, which de Valera
discussed in the usual doctrinaire fashion. 244
Ireland was during the Second World War, in theory at least, still a dominion
in the British Commonwealth, the United Kingdom's configuration of colonies,
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former colonies and dependencies. But Ireland's dominion status did not, in the
eyes of its government, require it to fight alongside Britain in its war against Nazi

Germany. Dublin's determination to remain neutral in 1939 was received with
sharp concern in Whitehall, 245 and it came as a surprise even to the Irish people. It
was, however, a decision firmly supported by the overwhelming majority of the
country's people and virtually every interest group, including politicians, diplomats,
writers, unionists, the press and the churches. 246 Given the peculiarities of Irish
history, especially the festering sore of partition, political reality allowed no other
course but neutrality.
But even in Britain, many influential persons considered Ireland's neutrality
probably the best course for both countries, reasoning that defending Ireland as a
co-belligerent would require stretching even further the Allies' already overextended resources. 247 Other British voices however - most notably Winston
Churchill's - advocated not neutrality, but an Allied occupation of Ireland so the
island could serve as a forward base from which to protect Britain's sea
approaches as well as to preempt a German occupation. 248
The famous remark, "Who are we neutral against?", asked by some
unknown Irishman at the war's outset, 249 found its way into the international press
and became during World War II a sort of epigrammatic symbol of Ireland's moral
245 John

Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, Oxford,

1982, 208-ff.
246

T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality andthe U.S.A. 1937-1947, Dublin, 1977,

247

Ibid, 208.

220.

248

In writing to.Roosevelt on June 2, 1940, Churchill said "an American
squadron at Bereshaven would do no end of good." Churchill, Their Finest Hour,
152.
249

Fodor, The Neutrals, 156.

90
dilemma. Because Ireland was almost entirely dependent on Britain for its
overseas trade, it was a source of considerable anxiety for many Irish to
contemplate their country not actively supporting Britain and its allies' cause
against that of Germany. 250 Yet it was the same Britain that many Irish hated
because of the deeply-wounding partition of the island.
If during World War II Spain became to the United States the most
reprehensible of the neutrals, it was Ireland that held that distinction for Britain.
Ireland's dilemma in World War II was, at bottom, a result of the resistance of its
prime minister, Eamon de Valera, to compromise Ireland's neutrality to a degree
acceptable to Britain in the person of its prime minister, Winston Churchill. But de
Valera regarded that neutrality as a test of Ireland's freedom from the United
Kingdom, and came to virtually "sanctify it as a principle ... to abandon which would
be apostasy."251 To the extent that Churchill's reaction to de Valera was tempered,
it was Roosevelt's White House that urged such moderation, despite the generally
anti-Irish attitude of David Gray (a relative by marriage to Roosevelt), the American
ambassador appointed to Dublin in March 1940. As late as 1943, Gray urged on
Washington the seizing of Irish bases by force, for which he would become virtually

persona non grata in Ireland by the end of the war. 252
There wasn't in September 1939, and wouldn't be throughout the nearly six
years of war, the slightest possibility that an unaided Ireland would be able to
successfully militarily defend itself against invasion by either Axis or Allies. In
September 1939, the total manpower of the Irish Army amounted to 7494 regular
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troops, 5066 reservists, and 7223 "volunteers", the latter a sort of home guard.
This force was charged with guarding a coastline of 3000 miles and the 250 miles
of intra-Irish border separating Ulster and the south, the latter popularly called the
Twenty Six Counties. 253 The army had at its disposal two "serviceable" tanks and
21 armored vehicles, most of which were in 1939 already antiques - 1920, and
earlier, Rolls-Royce's. The air force, a branch of the army (as in the United States
at the time), was equally toothless, with only 24 craft of which 10 might be called
modern by the standards of the time. The Twenty Six Counties were just about
completely defenseless in the terms of 1939 Europe. 254 But in a speech to the
National Defense Council in May 1940 (by which date the situation had changed
little from eight months earlier), de Valera put the best possible face on the situation
when he said the country's greatest chance to escape the European conflict lie in
mobilization and making the island too costly for any aggressor to attempt to
invade. 255
The Irish government squandered the months before outbreak of war, when
war was obviously imminent, as well as the period of the Phony War, to strengthen
its utterly inadequate armed forces. As a consequence, after the blitzkrieg in
western Europe in the spring of 1940, Dublin began making desperate appeals for
weapons to the United States. The British government concurred with these pleas,
253 There is some difficulty in what to call the non-Ulster part of the island at
this time. "Eire" was the co-official Irish (Gaelic) language name, but officially it was
theoretically meant to include Ulster as well. The south couldn't be called the
"Republic", which it didn't become until 1949. Just calling it "Ireland" doesn't
distinguish between the south and Ulster (officially Northern Ireland). Perhaps "the
Twenty Six Counties" - a commonly used term in Ireland and Britain in 1939 - is the
clearest name.
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but with the proviso that any weapons sent to Ireland not take precedence over
American arms committed to Britain. 256 Though it seems curious that Britain would

approve aid to Ireland at a time when it was badgering de Valera's government
over the former Treaty Ports, it is an indication of British concern that a German
invasion of a weak Ireland would equally imperil Britain. 257 But Washington hedged
on Dublin's appeals, finally informing de Valera that any arms would have to come
out of those sent to Britain and at Britain's discretion - Roosevelt's way of
expressing his displeasure at Irish neutrality. He told Gray that Ireland was going to
"have to fish or cut bait" 258 - appease Britain in the matter of the ports or go its own
way without American help.
De Valera's government had rationalized the Treaty Ports' denial to the
Royal Navy and to its de facto American ally in a way that received the full support
of the Irish parliament and people. He declared that the ports had been returned
by the British government at a time (1938)
when war was evidently imminent and after consideration of the
political and strategic factors involved ... there was, therefore, no
constitutional or political claim which the United Kingdom could
advance for their return. 259
Such remained Irish policy throughout the war, even though it meant incurring
London and Washington's undisguised wrath.
In June 1940, Dublin began to undertake new defense measures against the
increased threat posed by German-occupied France. It also feared a Britain
desperate to protect its shipping and to whom violation of Ireland's neutrality was
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far less worrisome than the specter - then deadly real - of losing the war at sea.
New calls for army volunteers went out (there was no draft) and a Local Security
Force was instituted for increased patrol and observation duties. Dublin's urban
defenses were expanded, major roadways and beaches were fitted with antiaircraft landing obstacles, and major ports were placed under military authority.
Most ominously, the government gave the violently anti-British Irish Republican
Army a sharp warning not to engage in any treasonous activities designed to assist
Germany in its war against Britain. 260
Because Ireland chose to stay out of Britain's conflict, the Irish people faced
real and serious hardships in a world in which the war had cut normal trade to a
relative trickle. The government had to institute measures early in the conflict to
ensure that the population would be fed, including nearly doubling the acreage
under crops through a compulsory planting policy decreed by parliament. Bread
nonetheless came under rationing from 1942 onward, as did tea, sugar and fuel.
Industrial capacity fell as a result of the drop in imports of raw materials, which in
turn resulted in higher unemployment. As in most of the world at war, a thriving
black market developed. 261
Like all the other successful neutrals except Switzerland, Ireland was
concerned not only by the threat of German invasion, but also by the possibility of
Anglo-American incursions or invasion to preempt the possibility of Axis use of its
territory. Though Hempel had on the day the war broke out given assurances to
the Irish government that Germany would respect Ireland's neutrality irrespective of
its Commonwealth dominion status, Dublin was given no such assurances from
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London that Britain would respect Ireland's neutrality. 262 Nonetheless, de Valera
informed Hempel that Ireland was bound to show "a certain consideration for
Britain", 263 and subtly warned the envoy that any German violation of Ireland's
neutrality - especially an attempt to coo pt the IRA to carry out espionage against
Britain on Irish territory, including Ulster-would inevitably lead Ireland into closer
cooperation with Britain. The "certain consideration for Britain" was eventually
carried to very un-neutral lengths in favor of the Allied cause that Hempel - sure of
Dublin's antipathy to London - couldn't have foreseen in 1939,264 and which will be
discussed below. Hempel informed Berlin, though, that he thought it "improbable"
that Britain would use force to regain use of the Treaty Ports - despite Irish fear that
Britain might indeed do just that. 265
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden described the dilemma posed by Irish
neutrality in a memorandum to the cabinet written two weeks after the war began:
On the constitutional side the question of any formal recognition by
this country of the neutrality of Eire266 presents a serious difficulty.
We do not want formally to recognise Eire as a neutral while Eire
remains a member of the British Commonwealth. To do this would
~ Because of fundamental disagreement between London and Dublin
regarding their legal relationship, there was no British diplomatic mission in Ireland
at the war's outset. The British insisted that any diplomatic representation be
headed by a High Commissioner, as was the case in the other dominions
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa), but de Valera, wanting to discard
what he considered "imperial trappings", demanded a full minister in what was in
reality far more a republic than a "dominion." Carroll, Ireland, 14. The governments
of the United Kingdom and of its other dominions all continued to regard Ireland as
a full member of the Commonwealth after the External Relations Act of 1936 was
confirmed in 1937 by Ireland's new Constitution -this despite Ireland's repudiation
of any allegiance to the Crown itself. Mansergh, Survey, 58-59.
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be to surrender the hitherto accepted constitutional theory of the
indivisibility of the Crown. Equally we do not want to take the line that
Eire is no longer a member of the British Commonwealth. This would
involve the rejection of the policy followed with the assent of the other
Dominions since the establishment of the new Constitution of Eire in
1937 and would moreover have serious repercussions in many
directions, e.g. the status under United Kingdom law of individual
lrishmen. 207
In the event, the advice tendered to the General Staff by Lord Chatfield,
Chief of the Naval Staff, was clear cut: the practical alternatives regarding Ireland's
role in the war were either a neutral Ireland or a hostile Ireland. 268 In 1941, Minister
for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures Frank Aiken wrote of this policy from the
Irish side:
If America comes first we are determined to shoot down the
Americans. If Britain comes first we will shoot them down with
greater relish. If the Germans comes first we will shoot them also. If
Britain genuinely believes that she is forestalling a German invasion
and rushes her Northern [Ulster] troops down along our coast or her
naval craft into our harbours, we are engaged immediately in bloody

war with England. 269
In 1940, at the most dangerous point in Britain's fight with Germany,
shipping losses270 seemed so desperate to Whitehall that an offer was made to
Ireland that Britain would unilaterally end the country's partition if Ireland would
agree to come into the war on the Allied side. In the late spring of that year, after
the German attacks on neutral Belgium and Holland, the British became convinced
that Ireland was about to be subject to a German invasion attempt. 271 Whitehall
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tried to persuade de Valera's government to immediately allow British troops into
Ireland to better enable those already in Ulster to repel the invasion in alliance with
the Irish Army.
In light of this situation, a formal British offer, signed by the Lord President of
the Council Neville Chamberlain, 272 was on June 28, 1940 conveyed to de Valera
with the following proposal:
A declaration to be made by the United Kingdom government
accepting the principle of a United Ireland. This declaration would
take the form of a solemn undertaking that the Union is to become at
an early date an accomplished fact from which there shall be no
turning back .... A joint Defence Council representative of Eire and
Northern Ireland to be set up immediately .... The Government of Eire
to invite British naval vessels to have the use of ports in Eire, and
British troops and aeroplanes to cooperate with the Eire forces and
to be stationed in such positions in Eire as may be agreed between
the two Governments, for the purpose of increasing the security of
Eire against the fate which has overcome neutral Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg .... The Government of Eire to intern
all German and Italian aliens in the country and to take any further
steps necessary to suppress Fifth Column activities. 273
Lord Craigavon, the British governor in Northern Ireland, lobbied against
this proposal from the viewpoint of Ulster, which is to say of Ulster's Protestant
majority. For his part, Churchill asserted he no wish to be "a party to the coercion
of Ulster", but "had no objection to Ulster being persuaded. "274 Writing to
Roosevelt on December 23, 1940, Churchill said:
It is not possible for us to compel the people of Northern Ireland
against their will to leave the United Kingdom and join southern
Ireland. But I do not doubt that if the Government of Eire would show
he had pondered on whether the Germans would "go to Ireland" invade the island.
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its solidarity with the democracies of the English-speaking world at
this crisis, a Council of Defence of all Ireland could be set up which
the unity of the island would probably in some form or other emerge
after the war. 275
Had this offer been accepted and later come into fruition, the history of
Anglo-Irish relations in the second half of the twentieth century would, of course,
have been greatly changed. But for many reasons, it was not accepted. For one,
the Protestants of Ulster believed that an integration into the south would represent
a desertion of the United Kingdom at a time when Britain and its commonwealth
were in enormous peril. Neither did Britain really want to risk a postwar neutralized
Ulster, the bases in that province providing its merchant shipping with forward
protection that Ireland would not allow in the Treaty Ports stand-off. But perhaps
most important, de Valera was utterly loath to send another generation of Irishmen
to their deaths in a European war. It was in repayment for the Home Rule Bill
before the first war that John Redmond had agreed to send to send thousands of
Irishmen into the trenches and to their deaths between 1914 and 1918. De Valera
had no wish to be his generation's Redmond. 276 And after centuries of English
duplicity, the prime minister knew also there was no guarantee that Britain would
honor its pledge of a united Ireland in the eventuality that it won the war. 277 Robert
Menzies, the Australian prime minister, in commenting on de Valera's actions in
1941, summed up the Irish leader's pragmatism:
... Great Britain could not possibly throw Ulster into Eire if that meant
that Ulster was also to become neutral and that Great Britain was to
be deprived of even those bases which she had then. In effect, [this]
campaign for union could not usefully or sensibly be pursued during
the war, assuming the neutrality of Eire. 278
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The value of Ireland's neutrality to Germany was put forward most strongly
in the person of the German minister in Dublin. In October 1939, Hempel had told
Berlin that consistent adherence to its neutrality was supported by the vast majority
of the Irish, and had "strengthened Irish national self-consciousness."279 When
Berlin was expressing fear in November 1940 that the IRA-German connection
would give Britain an excuse for invading the dominion, Hempel said such an
eventuality would cause the Irish first to seek aid from the still-neutral United States,
and only if unsuccessful would they turn to Germany. But he warned Berlin that
anyviolation of neutrality by Germany (most especially attempting to forcibly gain a
port for U-boat repairs) would cause de Valera to make good on his promise to
defend neutrality in the words: "if we must die for this then we will die for it. "280 It
isn't recorded what effect this somewhat toothless threat had in Berlin, but Ireland's
neutrality did in fact continue to be respected by Germany.
In reference to Britain's concern about the IRA-German connection, Irish
neutrality had been violated by Germany in a way that embarrassed Ireland and
caused Germany to fear losing what tepid popular Irish sympathy it had. German
agents were dropped by parachute and landed by submarines with instructions to
make contact with anti-British IRA elements, but with express orders not to take
any hostile actions against elements of the Irish army or of the Irish government.
Two of the agents were caught and tried, causing Dublin to be concerned that
relations with Germany would deteriorate dangerously, and causing Berlin to worry
about loss of face in lreland. 281
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The basis of Germany's strategic plans regarding Ireland continued to be
that the island should not be driven into Britain's camp before a possible German

invasion could take place, presumably after Britain's surrender. Such was the
primary reason for Germany excluding the Twenty Six Counties from its naval
blockade, a decision made on June 1, 1940 and for which the most pressing
argument was that a blockade would make the Irish people think that it was still
linked to Britain, "for better or for worse. "282 Though Hitler accepted this logic,
active planning for an Irish invasion was put off. 283
A German invasion of Ireland was most cogently argued against by the
German navy, which through its planning staff reasoned that as long as Britain
remained paramount in naval strength, any German invasion could still be
successfully thwarted by the Royal Navy. Britain's naval superiority remained
overwhelming in comparison to Germany's: two to one in battleships and twenty to
three in cruisers. Furthermore, surprise was out of the question because of
Ireland's location. The hope of developing secure supply lines was equally slim,
again because of Britain's superior naval strength. Even air support from
Germany's theoretically stronger air force was judged not to be decisive, mostly
because Ireland's notorious weather could at any time make air offense, defense
or supply unreliable. And finally, Northern Ireland was armed to the teeth. 284
Nonetheless, there is evidence that at least preliminary plans for an invasion
of Ireland were prepared by the Germans. Documents captured in Belgium in
October 1944 included a set of maps of every town in Ireland as well as maps of
the coastline and comments on conditions that the German troops could be
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expected to encounter; the maps were printed in 1940 and 1941 , with the latest
revisions made in 1943. 285 But in the absence of Irish cooperation, which Hitler

judged couldn't be expected because of de Valera's strong, consistent and
popularly-supported pledge to defend Ireland against any aggressor, he never
allowed any significant preparations for an Irish invasion to go forward.
One of the most pressing problems that faced de Valera throughout the war
was the need to "neutralise"287 the Irish Republican Army, which saw in Britain's
troubles the path to its own ends, namely the forcible political reintegration of Ulster
into Eire. The Dublin government, of which several ministers had been in the Civil
War period comrades of current IRA members, declared the organization illegal
just before the war broke out, reasoning that it could jeopardize the country's
neutrality policy. 288 But the IRA saw the start of the war as a signal to step up its
own war on Britain, a war taking the form of a bombing campaign in Britain that
culminated in a famous explosion in Coventry killing five people and injuring
sixty. 289 Even on its home ground, the IRA was able to sabotage the Irish Army and
de Valera's policy of even-handedness: on December 23, 1939, the outlawed
organization broke into Dublin's Phoenix Park's armory and stole over a million and
a half rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition. It was this exploit that
prompted the prime minister to crack down on both the IRA and civil liberties,
including instituting press censorship meant to keep political opinion "under
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control." 290 The Abwehrmeanwhile set up its own courier and communication
network with the IRA, a sabotage campaign in Ulster being one of the principal
ends of this network of IRA agents abetted with German expertise and materials.
Ireland's diplomatic contest with the Allies was never an easy one, not even
in relatively sympathetic Washington. Frank Aiken, Dublin's special envoy to the
U.S., visited Roosevelt in April 1941 to explain his government's case against cobelligerency with Britain. Aiken told Roosevelt that Ireland considered Britain as
much an invasion threat as it did Germany, but promised to be more forthcoming
to the British cause if Britain would give firm assurances that Ireland's neutrality
would be respected. Roosevelt railed against what he thought to be a suggestion
of moral equivalency between Britain and Germany, 291 but the outcome remained
that London would never at any time in the war assure Ireland that its borders
would be respected by British military forces, 292 a scenario de Valera believed
would provoke a German military response and turn the South into the battlefield
that Ulster had become. 293
After America entered the war, Churchill renewed his pressure on Dublin for
- as he phrased it - the "Orange and Green to unite", 294 proposing a reunification of
Ireland within the Empire under the old Home Rule scheme, a suggestion to which
his Irish counterpart didn't even deign to formally respond. De Valera's reaction
was emotional:
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from the moment that the war began there was for this state only one
policy possible - neutrality. Our circumstances, our history, the
incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our

country made any other policy impracticable. Any other policy would
have divided our people, and for a divided nation to fling itself into this
war would be to commit suicide. 295
Churchill shifted the onus onto the now-belligerent United States to punish
lreland. 296 He persuaded Roosevelt (who evidently needed little persuasion after
the interview with Aiken) to embargo food supplies from the U.S. to Ireland, adding
greatly to the already-serious shortages. 297 Arms promised Ireland's Defense
Force were also held back at Churchill's insistence. None of this changed de
Valera's stand at all, Churchill as well as Roosevelt underestimating both the Prime
Minister's commitment to neutrality and his fear that once Britain was back in
Ireland, it would never again leave. Fortunately for de Valera, he was backed to the
hilt in his recalcitrance by the vast majority of the Irish people, and, if anything,
Churchill's maneuver hardened Irish resolve to remain neutral. 298
After American entry into the war, Ireland's value as a potential cobelligerent with the Allies began to lose its appeal, 299 its worth as a partner far
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outweighed by the estimated cost of supplying and defending it. But when forces
of the now-belligerent U.S. landed in Ulster in January 1942, de Valera was still
quick to protest:
... it is our duty to make it clearly understood that, no matter what
troops occupy the six counties, the Irish people's claim for the union
of the whole of the national territory, and for supreme jurisdiction over
it, will remain unabated ... the maintenance of the partition of Ireland is
as indefensible as aggression against small nations elsewhere, which
is the avowed purpose of Britain and the U.S. in this war to bring to
an end. 300
For the remainder of the war, the stand-off between Allies and Ireland particularly between Churchill and de Valera - continued with a passion. The
economic war of retaliation Britain waged with the U.S. 's help against its former
possession went on, and Ireland learned to make do entirely with what it could
grow on its own soil. It also lost much of the sympathy of formerly supportive
American groups: thousands of Americans went down on ships that might not
have been lost if Irish bases had been available for forward sealane protection. 301
The fact that nearly 100,000 Irish volunteers served (and were freely allowed by
their government to serve) in the British army was discounted, as were the growing
compromises Ireland made to base Allied sea rescue services from its soil and the
fact that Ireland lent Ulster - particularly Belfast - great assistance throughout its
trials from German bombing. 302
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Before the war ended, Ireland would be subjected to one last broadside, this
time from Washington. The issue that caused the U.S. government to present
through its embassy in Dublin a formal demarch6 to the de Valera government was
the continued presence of German diplomatic representation in the Irish capital,
which Washington believed allowed Germany greater freedom in its spying on
Allied activities. The following highly-charged diplomatic note was delivered to the
Irish government on February 22, 1944:
The neutrality of the Irish government has in fact operated and
continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the
United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your
national economy depend ... one of the gravest and most inequitable
results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized
espionage which the geographical ROSition of Ireland afforded the
Axis and denies the United Nations. 303
But de Valera rejected without equivocation this American demand that Hempel
and his staff be returned to Germany, a decision to which virtually all Irish political
factions agreed on the rationale that the German and Japanese diplomats in
Ireland were incapable, at this late date, of carrying out successful espionage
activities in light of the Irish precautions taken to prevent them. 304 Privately, the
response of the Irish prime minister to the American demand was one of shock - de
Valera believed the aid given by Ireland to the Allied cause far outweighed the
hardship it cost them by Ireland remaining neutral. His response to the demarch~
was that the Irish people had newfound respect for the British because of Britain's
respect for Ireland's neutrality during the war, and it would be regretted if this latest
American demand should mar these new feelings. With Dublin's promise to
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institute additional security measures against the Axis missions in Dublin, and on
Churchill's advice, Washington dropped the matter. 305
At the European war's end, in a victory speech reflecting the sentiments of
his American and Soviet allies, Churchill showed no magnanimity toward Ireland
and its policy of neutrality, the policy that had, in de Valera's view, saved Ireland's
citizenry and its cities from the fate suffered by Europe's belligerents. Instead, the
British prime minister heaped abuse on the Irish for not coming to the aid of the
anti-Nazi alliance. But in a speech to the Dail shortly after learning of Churchill's
words, de Valera quoted a letter he had received from a fellow Irishman. It
,

--:1~ither

America nor the Soviet Union could justify their criticism of Ireland

•,

tor ren'°''· .1g neutral when they themselves had remained neutral at a time when

their neighbors and allies were being attacked - both waiting to join the fray only
after coming under the gun themselves. De Valera concluded that the difference
was only that Ireland had

not been attacked - but would have fought like a tiger had

it been. 306
The war probably was the factor that most firmly set Britain's future course
in Ulster. The debt the British owed the loyal Unionists in Northern Ireland gave the
latter a security they wouldn't otherwise have gained, and drove a deep wedge
between the two political parts of the island. 307
But the Twenty Six Counties were well-served by Eamon de Valera. Had he
taken his country into war, he would have been thwarting the will of the vast
majority of his countrymen. De Valera was right that most of the belligerents especially the United States - didn't come into the war until they themselves were
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attacked, which was long after the depradations of Naziism were documented.
Nonetheless, thousands of Irish citizens voluntarily fought - and many died - on the

Allied side. Eight Victoria Crosses attest to their valor. 308
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TURKEY
"What we would like is for
the Germans to destroy the
Russians and the Allies then
to destroy the Germans."
Anonymous Turkish wartime quote309
That Turkey remained a non-belligerent almost until the final days of World
War II was the result, primarily, of a stand-off between the blocs due to a
geographical position coveted by both, and, to a lesser but nonetheless significant
degree, of its military capabilities and political determination to defend its own
territory. It was Turkey that controlled the overland route from Europe to the
Middle East, the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, areas in which the Germans
believed they could knock Britain out of the war and which Britain knew it had to
control notto be knocked out of the war. For Turkey's neutrality, the British had in
reality good reason to be grateful: with Turkey a German ally in 1940 or 1941, the
Middle East may well have been lost to the British.
Even though Turkey's military capacity and political will were lesser
contributors to its neutrality than was its geography, there is evidence Hitler judged
the Wehrmachtwould not be able to take Turkey against its will. 310 Though in no
position to engage in state-of-the-art mechanized warfare, the Turkish army was in
1939 reputed (accurately) to be of tenacious fighting capacities - a situation
conversely abetted by the fact that Turkey's communications and supply lines
were, at best, rudimentary. 311 Turkey's leaders knew the country was unable to
ward off the Germans alone, but because of their well-trained and determined army
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(though one deficient in modern arms) they calculated that Germany wouldn't
casually pay the very high price required for violating the country's neutrality.
Furthermore, Turkey's leaders were loathe to damage the carefully-built framework
of a modern state Ataturk had created on the Ottoman ruins. Finally, the
experiences of the debacle between 1914 and 1918 were still very fresh in
memory. 312
An important factor besides geography in the relationship of Turkey to the
warring blocs was the country's chromite ore, of which in 1939 Turkey controlled
16.4% of the world's production. 313 From chromite is derived both chromium and
chrome: chromium, the more strategically important, is an essential component in
the manufacture of high-grade steel. Germany obtained nearly its entire supply of
chromite ore from Turkey during World War II, a factor which allowed the Turks to
play their chromite card to great advantage: for critical materials which only
Germany would supply, the Turks would pay in chromite, and any sense of
disadvantage314 was swallowed by the Germans as they saw their stocks of this
critical material steadily erode after June 1941.315
The Allies had tried to preempt Turkish chromite when in 1940 Britain
negotiated an agreement with Turkey, contracting for the following two years' neartotal supply at highly inflated prices (and having to buy along with it some relatively
unimportant foodstuffs) on the condition that none whatsoever be sold to
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Germany. Germany quickly felt the resulting tightening of supplies, and its special
trade representative, Dr. Karl Clodius, went to Ankara to negotiate an end to

Britain's monopoly of Turkey's production. 316 Clodius was partially successful. In
October 1941 the Turks agreed that when the British deal expired it would ship
90,000 tons of chromite to Germany, providing Germany also buy, at grossly
inflated prices, a large portion of the domestic farm commodities then glutting the
Turkish market. But when the Germans couldn't wait until the beginning of 1943
(when the agreement with Britain was scheduled to expire) and its ambassador,
Franz von Papen, 317 tried to arrange to smuggle ore out of the country, the
offended Turks nearly canceled the deal. 318 As it happened, after January 1943,
Turkish chromite again was being openly sent to Germany. 319
A key in understanding the motivation behind Turkey's behavior - Turkey's
"duplicity", as the belligerent blocs might have put it - during the war is
understanding the traditional hatred felt by Turks for Russia and the Russians, a
hatred going back three centuries and 13 wars. When the Ottoman Empire began
to crumble in earnest in the early 19th century, the ascendent Russian Empire was,
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along with Great Britain, the nation most concerned with picking up the broken
pieces. The Russians yearned for guaranteed free passage through the Straits,

and Britain worried that if Russia became a Mediterranean power its own newlyacquired lifeline to the Orient through the Suez Canal would as a result be
threatened. 320
In the Constantinople Agreement of March 18, 1915, between Great Britain,
France and Russia, Russia was promised the capital, the Bosporus, the Sea of
Marmara and the Dardanelles. The Bolshevik Revolution rendered the agreement
void (Lenin specifically repudiated it), but the war's end nevertheless resulted,
through the October 1918 Armistice of Mudros, in Allied-guaranteed free passage
through the Straits to the new Soviet state. 321 Throughout the latter part of the
1930s Turkey nonetheless felt relatively safe from Russian aggrandizement, having
established normal diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1934; during this period the
busy-elsewhere Soviets adopted a status quo policy with Ankara in which no
demands on Turkish territory were made. But when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
was announced on August 29, 1939, the Turks were shaken to find the Soviets
joining the Germans in their plan to redraw the map of Europe. Ankara's belief that
a false military step might provoke the Soviets into invading Turkish territory led to a
policy of realism vis-a-vis the Soviets, one that finally ended in a November 1940
non-aggression pact with their old enemy. 322
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A prime part of German diplomatic policy in the period just before its attack
on Poland was to keep Turkey from cooperating with Britain and France, with

whom it expected to put together a series of encircling pacts and alliances in the
Middle East. But the Soviets, too, wanted to ensure that Turkey stayed as isolated
as possible from the western European allies, not only to appease Moscow's new
German partners, but because a Turkey close to the Western powers would likely
allow them use of the Straits to aid Rumania in wartime, and Russia wanted to keep
any European war as far from the Soviet Union as possible. 323
When the European war broke out on September 1, 1939, Turkey's policy
was to keep clear of the fray, but the various means it took to this end were
inevitably shaped by its everpresent fear and distrust of Russia. Turkey's only
major move during the early part of the war was closure of the Straits to foreign
warships, 324 a move taken in accord with the policy set out in the Montreaux
Convention of 1936 that regulated the use of the Straits. But matters became
complicated when Italy entered the war against Britain and France and therefore
theoretically requiring Turkey to take action against Italy· in accordance with the
Tripartite Treaty it had signed with France and Great Britain on October 19, 1939, a
treaty that had been a kind of reward to France for its forbearance in the Hatay
controversy involving the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Turkey's only irredentist claim
since the establishment of the post-Ottoman republic. 325
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But by the spring of 1940 the European military situation had changed so
much from that in effect when the treaty was negotiated that Turkey decided to stay
neutral and to avoid repeating its error of the First World War, 326 foreseeing cobelligerency with the Allies bringing only German invasion and destruction to its
own shores. Although Turkey was diplomatically bound by this treaty to enter the
war on the Allied side against Italy after the latter became involved in June 1940,
Britain did not press Ankara to honor its obligation. Turkey was militarily relatively
weak in terms of armor and artillery, and for it to have declared war on an Axis
partner might well have had the effect of turning Nazi armies into the Middle East
through Turkey in the pursuit of Hitler's aim to close the Suez Canal. The British at
this point principally desired that the Turks maintain friendly neutrality against the
day when the

coun~ry's

help might be vitally needed. As long as Germany wished

to stay friendly with a Soviet Union which would be antagonized at any German
advance through Turkey and the Middle East, Ankara's concurrence in this policy
held.
But Hitler's real diplomatic objective regarding Turkey was to assure its
neutrality after his planned attack on Russia. After Turkey was assured by the
German chancellor in March 1941 that he had no designs on it, and that his troops,
which had just invaded Bulgaria, would be kept 60 kilometers back from the
Turkish frontier, President lsmet Inonu responded to Hitler that Turkey would also
remain neutral as regarded the Axis, a signal that German troops could proceed
consult with them and maintain benevolent neutrality; and, finally, that if any
European country attacked any nation in such a way to threaten the others, all
would consult with view to common action. Quoted from Chester M. Tobin, Turkey
- Key to the East, New York, 1944, 143-144. The treaty, incidentally, in no way
required Turkey to become involved with the Soviet Union, even if Britain and/or
France and the USSR should become allies - except to allow Soviet naval vessels
through the Straits. Eren, Turkey Today, 223.
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into Yugoslavia and Greece without having to worry about Turkey's reaction. The
cautious Turks did, however, blow up the bridges over the Maritsa River - the
Turco-Bulgarian frontier - as a defensive measure.
Not knowing, of course, that Germany was soon to be at war with Russia,
the Turks believed a peaceable relationship was a necessity with the power that
was now in a position to immediately attack its whole western seaboard, including
its two chief commercial cities of Istanbul and Izmir. 327 Papen had been urging a
non-aggression pact on Ankara, and when in June 1941 Turkey became nearly
surrounded by German-occupied countries or countries in political accordance
with Germany, Ankara felt it had to give the Germans what they wanted. 328 Hitler's
lightning conquest of the Balkans and subsequent concentration of forces in
Bulgaria so impressed Ankara that it yielded to Papen's pressure to sign a treaty of
friendship and non-aggression 329 (which treaty nonetheless "allowed" it to reserve
its obligations to Britain under the Tripartite treaty330). On June 14, Papen wrote to
the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:
As a consequence of Italy's entry into the war and upon requests by
the English and French Ambassadors the Turkish Government has
examined the situation and decided: Turkey's entry into the war in the
present situation might possibly help her in a war with the USSR. The
Government has therefore decided to invoke Protocol No. 2 of the
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328
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English-French-Turkish Pact and to maintain its neutrality in the new
conflict accordingly.33 1
Hitler would have, of course, preferred an active ally of Turkey, but was willing to
settle with its "friendship" rather than risk the Russian campaign by diverting forces
to conquer a Turkey militarily allied with Britain.
When Germany attacked Russia on June 21, 1941, the revised state of
affairs made the question of passage for Russian vessels - guaranteed to an Allied
partner in the 1939 pact with Britain and France - a matter that Ambassador von
Papen discussed with some urgency with the Turkish authorities. In a telegram to
Ribbentrop two days after the Russo-German war began, Papen outlined the
Turkish response.
Today I discussed with Saracoglu [the Turkish Foreign Minister] the
question of Russian shipping. Passage of Russian naval vessels is
completely out of the question. The Bosporus and the Dardanelles
are closed by net defenses and sown with mines. Passage of Soviet
merchant vessels appears to the Foreign Minister not very likely at
this time because in the initial phase of the war Russia would
undoubtedly not want to divest herself of her merchant tonnage for
the benefit of England. In any event, he is apparently willing to
cooperate with us in this matter also, and he gromised that he would
promptly inform me of any Russian demarche in that regard. 332
Turkey justified refusing passage to Soviet naval vessels through the Straits by the
prior constraints of the Montreaux Convention of 1936, but Germany wanted
Turkey to cooperate in the immediate denial of passage to Russian merchant
shipping as well, primarily so the Germans could capture the 400,000 tons of
merchant vessels in the Black Sea. A secondary reason for Germany's urgency in
this regard was to prevent Britain's use of Russian tonnage in the Mediterranean, a
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highly likely Anglo-Russian arrangement in light of Britain's dearth of merchant
ships in the Mediterranean. 333
Because of the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht in Russia after June 22,
German demands on Turkey's freedom of action became increasingly bolder, and
Turkey conversely less willing to resist those demands. Although Turkey stood by
her agreement with Britain regarding the preemptive buying of chromite, it still
couldn't ignore the inescapable fact that the German armies were within 100 miles
of Istanbul. 334 Another consideration in Turkish politics was the fact that because it
was the Soviets who were getting butchered by the Wehrmacht, Germany was
gaining sympathy from the right-wing segment of Turkey's political elite. The
Germans were helped further in their psychological position by revealing to the
Turks the Soviets' long-term goals of controlling outright the Straits, information
which Molotov had revealed to Ribbentrop during the period of the Nazi-Soviet
collaboration. 335
In the months following Germany's attack on Russia, it was the German
contention that in the event of an Allied victory Turkey would have nothing to gain
and a great deal to lose. Germany furthered its propaganda war in Turkey by
promising German assistance to the right-wing in supporting the Pan-Turkic
movement, especially in the reversion to Turkey of Moslem-speaking areas of the
Soviet Caucasus. While many Turks would have appreciated adding these Soviet
lands to their own territory, not even the Pan-Turkists, however, wanted to give
Stalin or his armies the slightest pretext to slaughter the Turko-Mongol minorities
then still firmly under Soviet control. Turkey continued to remain officially neutral,
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and Ribbentrop ordered Papen to discontinue any further inducements of Germanabetted Pan-Turkism. By this time - mid-1942 - it was becoming apparent to the
Turks that the German ability to back either promises or threats in regard to Turkey
were becoming increasingly limited. 336
After June 1941, Turkish knowledge of Soviet designs on the Straits was a
major factor in hindering a closer relationship between Turkey and the Allies. 337
When Stalingrad fell in February 1943, the Soviets tried to bring Turkey into the war,
tactically to draw German divisions off the Russian front and thus to permit more
rapid Russian progress in the East, but strategically to create a situation which
could later be exploited to allow Soviet armies to enter Turkey. Soviet insistence
after 1943 that Turkey enter the war - in contradiction to its British and American
allies' stand that Turkey could legitimately follow a less drastic, albeit pro-Allies,
course of action - seemed proof to Ankara that Russia's primary motivation was to
find an excuse to make an occupation possible, and, more importantly, to
legitimize Soviet claims to control over the Straits in the postwar world. 338
But increased non-Soviet Allied pressure on Turkey in late 1942 to bring the
country into the war did begin to be exerted, although it was relatively low-key and
with no ultimatum being issued to force Turkey's hand: neither London nor
Washington wanted Turkey to refuse "future" belligerency outright, which might
have led the Germans to better use the 26 divisions they had sitting virtually
immobilized on the Bulgarian frontier. The Turks in any case procrastinated, as
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was their wont, requesting more weapons and supplies before thinking seriously of
coming into active co-belligerency. 339
There was another major issue, separate from this political see-sawing, but
one which gives an insight to the domestic political scene in wartime Turkey. In
1942 and 1943, Turkey became embroiled in a controversy that has become one of
the most infamous episodes in its modern history: the Varlik Vergisi, or Capital Tax.
This levy emulated some of the worst features of Nazi Germany's racialism mixed
with the old Ottoman Empire's fanaticism, and is adjudged the most shameful
episode of Turkey's domestic government policies during this period. 340
Approved by the Grand National Assembly, the tax was a seemingly
reasonable measure to raise money in an economy mired in constant war-induced
fiscal crises. The target of the tax was the great fortunes that had hitherto been
pretty much free from taxation as a result of the ease of tax evasion then common
in Turkey. In reality, the levy was undisguisedly aimed at three "alien", minority
communities: the Greeks, the Jews, and the Armenians. Failure to pay the
assessments - in many cases, the amounts levied were considerably higher than
the victims' total assets - led to confiscations and even to imprisonment at hard
labor.
The measure's preamble stated that it was "aimed at those who have
amassed inflated profits by exploiting the difficult economic situation but do not pay
commensurate taxes" - clearly meaning Turkey's overly-successful alien
minorities. 341 The remissions that the Finance Ministry did finally allow late in 1943,
essentially because of Allied pressure in the matter that had been prompted by
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outrage in the American Armenian community, were too late to save the victims,
almost all of whom were non-Muslim. In March 1944 the Assembly finally canceled
all amounts still unpaid, but added insult to injury by "penalizing those who had
made payment and rewarding those who had somehow managed to avoid it". 342
The legacy of the Capital Tax was the damage done to Turkey's reputation in the
West. The German press hailed the tax as a "justified" measure against "alien
blood."
When Turkey was of greatest importance to the non-Axis cause by serving
as a buffer to Axis expansion into the Middle East - which is to say before the
United States became a belligerent - relations between Ankara and Washington
were relatively low-key, the greatest American emphasis in Turkey being on
persuading the Turks to remain neutral, and using economic assistance as its
primary tool to ensure such neutrality. The ever-sanguine (except where de Valera
was concerned) Churchill assured Roosevelt that Turkey was doing as little for the
Nazi cause as could be expected of it under the circumstances.
Even after the American entry into the war and the subsequent lessening of
Turkey's strategic geographical importance to the Axis, the Allies still decided in
December 1942 they wanted to bring Turkey and its two-million man army into the
war "in principle. "343 Two months later, Churchill met with President Inonu at
Adana, in southern Turkey, to try to bring this about. But Inonu told Churchill that
before his country could come in on the Allied side, Turkey would have to have
more military supplies, a demand to which the British leader reluctantly agreed.
While these Allied-Turkish negotiations were taking place, Germany still had the
strength to force a withdrawal of the British landing on the Dodecanese Islands,
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German-held Greek islands immediately off Turkey's west coast. It served as a
pointed reminder to Ankara that it had still better proceed with caution where an
open declaration of belligerency against the Reich was concerned. 344
In mid-1944, the United States finally demanded that Turkey break relations
with Germany, that the Straits be barred to German shipping, and that all
shipments of chromite ore to the Axis be stopped - the threat being backed up with
an immediate and complete cut-off of further arms to Turkey. 345 The Turks yielded,
knowing that little danger from Germany now existed and that their country had
become - gratefully- not much more than a backwater in the war. Furthermore,
they wanted the American arms for the postwar fight they expected with Russia. 346
On June 15, 1944 Turkey finally ceased to allow (at Allied urging) Germany secret
passage of any naval craft through the Straits, and on August 25 diplomatic
relations between Berlin and Ankara were suspended by the latter. 347 On January
12, 1945, Turkey opened the Straits to supply ships bound for Soviet ports, and
two weeks later cut relations with Japan. Nonetheless, when in early 1945 Turkey's
1935 ten-year friendship pact with the Soviet Union expired, the Soviets gave notice
to Ankara that the treaty wouldn't be renewed unless the Turkish provinces of Kars
and Ardahan were handed over to the Soviet Union, along with an agreement to
Soviet "participation" in the defense of the Straits. All the demands were instantly
rejected by the Turkish government. 348
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Finally, on February 22, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany so it could
become a charter member of the new United Nations Organization, and thus have
a place at the victors' table to better protect its sovereignty on the Straits against
Russian expansionism. Even this pro forma declaration didn't engender much
enthusiasm in the government, however, the country's leadership feeling the move
too closely paralleled Mussolini's despised declaration of war on the West in June
1940. Though the Allies had by this time become heartily sick of Turkey's footdragging on the issue of co-belligerency, it was nonetheless important to Western
interests that Turkey secure a respectable place in the United Nations to better
"uphold her sovereignty over the Straits."349 On March 21, a month after the
declaration of war by Turkey, Moscow formally confirmed that the Soviet-Turkish
Friendship Pact would not be renewed, signaling the beginning of an increasingly
dangerous period of relations between the neighboring countries. 350
In summary, perhaps Turkey's behavior in World War II can best be
explained by its unwillingness to dissipate its strength in any fight against the Axis,
when it believed that strength would eventually be needed to defend itself against
the Russians. In light of Soviet demands on Turkish sovereignty at the war's end,
and the knowledge of Molotov's designs on the Straits, the country's course can at
least be understood in a framework of self-preservation.

should be established on the Straits - both involving flagrant violations of Turkey's
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CHAPTER Ill
CONCLUSIONS
The Swedish diplomat Gunnar Haeggloef wrote that
neutrality has to be supported by a reasonably efficient defense
system; politics of neutrality require steady support from all the
important political groups of the country; and, most important of all,
the basic condition of neutrality is a balance of power. 1
This was largely the underlying formula that allowed six countries to stay out of the
European catastrophe that was the Second World War. Many other factors
contributed to the neutrals' removal from harm's way- geography, personalities,
the fatigue following civil war, luck. But Mr. Haeggloef's first point - a strong
defensive capability - was for four of the World War II European non-belligerents a
major contributing factor in their neutrality: Germany calculated that Spain,
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey represented nuts not worth cracking as long as
they did the Axis little harm and continued to provide it with vital war materiel. Selfdefense capabilities were not primary guarantors of Portuguese and Irish
neutrality, but these two states' promises to tenaciously defend their territory
against any aggressor were known to and undoubtedly figured to some degree in
the strategic planning of the belligerents.
It should be noted that while the neutrals maintained military forces that
were in most cases much larger than their normal peacetime defense
establishments, all six were still very much less burdened in this regard than were
the fighting nations. Even though inflated relative to the neutrals' pre-war defense
1 M.
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budgets, the proportion of money, manpower and production facilities of the
warring states dedicated to military-related purposes vastly exceeded in virtually all

cases that which the neutrals were required to spend in this regard. 2
No one of the neutrals stayed out of World War II simply because it wanted
to, or because the belligerents had any real regard for neutrality as such. Rather it
was a matter of weighing the costs of overcoming armies, in the cases of
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey, or of supporting their participation in the case of
Spain, or of fighting their protectors, as with Ireland and Portugal. Though the
majority of Europe's states a/so wished in 1939 and 1940 to remain neutral, the
balance in their regard came down on the other side, a fact which would seem to
confirm that the concept of neutrality was in itself valueless in Europe during the
Second World War. The chance of success was the real factor a potential
aggressor weighed in determining whether to violate a state's neutrality.
Though historians have tended to lump together the two Iberian
dictatorships in terms of World War II policies, Spain and Portugal presented
differing problems for the belligerents. Spain may very well have voluntarily joined
the Axis as a co-belligerent had Franco considered that his country could have
gotten more out of such a move than it would have cost it. But due to its own civil
war Spain was a pauperized nation, and Hitler wasn't willing or able to meet the
(admittedly high) material demands that were Franco's price for bringing his
country into the conflict. Though the Germans considered the possibility of taking
Spain against its will, such a move never became a serious option, primarily
because Spain's military capacity to defend its sovereignty would have been too
much for the Wehrmachtto overcome in light of Hitler's other, evidently more
pressing, military obligations. Though a German-controlled Gibraltar would have
2 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 213.
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been of supreme military significance, in 1940 and 1941 Hitler must have
calculated that the Axis could count on Franco's cooperation after his other
enemies were beaten. But by 1942, it was becoming apparent that this scenario
was no longer likely to play and that the over-extended Reich no longer had the
capacity to impose its will on an unreceptive Spain.
The Allies never had plans to militarily take Spain, and considering their
ability to choke off the country's trade through embargo, they never had to - at
least not as long as Spain kept the Germans out. The biggest Ally concern was
whether Franco might in some way oppose the North African Torch campaign of
1942, but it turned out that it was Franco who was concerned - that the Allies
would use Spain as their access point to re-enter occupied Europe.
Portugal could never be considered by the Germans separately from Spain:
an invasion of a hostile Spain would have inevitably meant including Portugal, and,
conversely, there was no realistic way to occupy Portugal without Spanish
acquiescence or without Spanish hostility. That Portugal remained scrupulously
neutral was all Germany could expect, and which was in fact very much to
Germany's benefit. Though Hitler couldn't have Azores bases, Portugal saw to it
that until late in the war neither could Britain or the United States. And while the
Azores weren't all that critical to Germany's war effort, the islands would have
been a tremendous tactical and strategic boon to the Allied cause had they been
available earlier in the war.
Portugal didn't have the wherewithal to make military might an important
part of its neutrality policy, but it did have the political consensus for noninterference that was necessary to successful neutrality, and it was fortunate that
the power of the belligerent blocs balanced each other in respect to Portugal. Had
Germany made the first move on the Azores, the still-neutral United States would
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very likely have contested it as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; and both
sides knew that any attempted move against the Portuguese mainland would have
meant taking on Spain as well.
Switzerland and Sweden both used the threat of destruction of vitallyimportant resources as primary barriers to German invasion. In both cases, these
threats were importantly backed-up with the military capacity to cause any invader
substantial losses while waging a holding action during which, in Switzerland's
case, Alpine tunnels were destroyed, and, in Sweden's case, iron ore facilities put
to the torch. It is clear that in neither of these countries' cases were their long-time
professions of neutrality a factor in their safety. It came instead from the will to
remain neutral by paying the substantial cost of arming themselves meaningfully
and to destroy a large part of their infrastructures if the military shields were
insufficient.
Sweden also had to face the possibility of an Allied violation of its territorial
sovereignty, one in conjunction with a move against occupied Norway or to assist
Finland. Though neither Britain nor the United States coveted Sweden for the
purpose of getting at its natural resources, which would have represented a
primary German consideration, any such move against it or Norway would have
very likely invoked a German response, 3 the effect of which would have been a
devastated and/or occupied Sweden. Although the Allied threat was minimal and
short-lived, Sweden's pledges to Berlin given in the name of its king to fight any
invader were undoubtedly heard as unambiguously in London and Washington as
they were in the German capital.

3 This according to the Swedish ambassador in London during the war,

Gunnar Haeggloef. Quoted in Ogley, Theory & Practice, 171.
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Switzerland faced no physical threat to its territory from the Allies, suffering
only material blockade from that quarter. Its military shield was aimed solely at the

Wehrmacht (Mussolini never waved a sword in Switzerland's direction, even
though Italy's entry into the war in June 1940 completely changed Switzerland's
economic position.) In purely military terms, the Swiss defense shield played the
most important part in the success of any of the six states' neutrality. Though like
the other neutrals it can be said that Switzerland was fortunate in that Germany
simply never had to have it for strategic purposes, the reverse is also true that
Germany would have taken Switzerland if it had been easy enough. But the Swiss
went to expensive lengths to convince Berlin that it wouldn't be anything like easy,
and that the advantages Berlin could have from the Swiss for the asking (or, more
precisely, for the paying) would be violently denied if its territorial sovereignty was
threatened.
Turkey walked as fine a line between the demands of the belligerents as
any of the neutrals. The fact that it was at the juncture point of the great wartime
blocs - the Axis dominating the Balkans to the west, the Russians to the north, and
Britain and its allies preeminent in the Arab world to the south - meant that the
country straddled the eye of the wartime hurricane. With its control of crucial
communications lines between these blocs, and thus threatened by their needs
(even though after June 1941 the latter two were allies, their reasons for wanting to
control Turkey were not, of course, in harmony), never was Turkey as in need of
diplomatic skills as during the war and never were those skills so successfully
employed.
Not all of Turkey's tightrope walking was seen as evenhanded, which is
unsurprising. The Soviets used the matter of Ankara allowing minor German naval
craft through the Straits during the war as a pretext for urging the "revision" of
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control of the waterway in its favor after the war. There is, however, no evidence
that Turkey's concessions in this regard contributed significantly to the Axis war
effort. In any event, just as many concessions were made in the Allies' favor, the
matter of allowing western preemption of chromite ore being one of the most
important. Turkey was, after all, being forced to balance demands from all
quarters to protect its neutrality, a neutrality which the Turks regarded as critical to
their own well-being - a not unreasonable view in light of the condition of most of
the rest of Europe in 1945.
Ireland was, of the neutrals, odd man out. In addition to the usual contempt
the warring nations felt for the non-belligerents, Britain deemed itself betrayed by
the neutrality of a nation that had been for centuries a part of "its" world. Still
legally an integral component of the political association of the United Kingdom
(even though the Irish government held that its membership in the Commonwealth
was essentially meaningless), the attitude of the Irish toward Britain was shaped
mostly by simple hatred for having been bled white for all those centuries and for
the fact that a good chunk of its national territory was still being denied it by the
despised British.
But Dublin's ability to remain neutral was partly predicated on the
awareness that had Germany launched an invasion against Ireland, Britain would
have had to repel it. In retrospect, Ireland never stood in any substantive danger
of such an undertaking, although if an assault on Britain had been successfully
carried out, Ulster would very likely have been eventually taken, which would have
ended with the rest of the island coming under German domination even without
the Twenty Six Counties being technically violated.
It can't be said that Ireland's military defense capabilities would have been
of any significant consideration in either side's decision to occupy all or part of the
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island. As dearly as the Irish population may have held their neutrality and
sovereignty, their military capacity to defend such were never highly developed.
That Britain retained Ulster after the establishment of the rest of Ireland's
independence accounts in largest part for the fact that Irish neutrality was not
violated by the Allies: Ulster was available to serve as a forward base from which to
protect Britain's sea lanes, and therefore taking the southern Treaty Ports never
became absolutely necessary. Had it been, the ports would have become a
legitimate German target, and Ireland might very well then have slid into the war on
the Allied side on the basis of 'in for a penny, in for a pound.' Ironically, such a
scenario may have had a profoundly important postwar effect: loyally orange
Ulster became so antipathetic to the Twenty Six Counties between 1939 and 1945
that the chances for ending the island's partitioned status after the war were
greatly diminished, not to say unattainable.
The lessons learned about European neutrality in the Second World War
seem most clearly to indicate that neutrality was a failure. Of the 20 "neutrals" at
war's outbreak, only six successfully maintained their outsiders' status. There
were, as Gunnar Haeggloef put it, more Norways - and Hollands and Belgiums
and Hungarys and Greeces - than there were Swedens. Following the war, almost
all the European states joined one of the two Great Power blocs that re-jiggered
the continent along all new lines of dialectic. 4
It was doubted right after World War II that neutrality could any longer have
much meaning. Major wars of the future were seen, ipso facto, as being
potentially nuclear conflicts, thus making the idea of sitting them out meaningless.
In truth, neutrality now has almost no meaning in terms of nuclear war. But as

4 Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia are still theoretically aloof from such

alliances, but few doubt in which direction their basic political orientations lie.
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regards all the regular little wars, military capabilities would appear today to be the
most popular guarantor of "neutrality", an observation borne out by the
astronomical levels of military spending in virtually every country in the world. In
fact, the endless procession of quite ordinary, if just as lethal, wars has gone on in
the last forty-plus years quite unabated, and while most of the several dozen new
states created in those decades have declared their total impartiality in struggles
between the Powers, they've nonetheless continued the small-time slaughter of
each other's citizens with something that has often approached abandon.
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